University of Wollongong

Research Online
Centre for Multicultural Studies Working Papers

Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts

1992

The challenge of multiculturalism: global changes
and Australian experiences
Stephen Castles
University of Wollongong

Recommended Citation
Castles, Stephen, The challenge of multiculturalism: global changes and Australian experiences, Centre for Multicultural Studies,
University of Wollongong, Working Paper 19, 1992, 109.
http://ro.uow.edu.au/cmsworkpapers/17

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au

The challenge of multiculturalism: global changes and Australian
experiences
Abstract

The aim of this paper is to examine the experience of Australia with regard to immigration and migrant
settlement since 1945, and to discuss the model of multiculturalism which has emerged as a way of shaping
social policy and national identity in an increasingly diverse society. Australia is widely regarded as a 'classical
country of immigration'. Indeed, apart from Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders who make up
approximately 2 per cent of the population, the whole Australian people can trace their origins back to the
immigrations which started with British colonization in 1788. Immigration has always been a central part of
nation-building in Australia. Since 1945, there has been a planned program of mass immigration. Today, one
in five Australians are immigrants or children of immigrants, and the country is one of the most ethnically
diverse in the world.

This working paper is available at Research Online: http://ro.uow.edu.au/cmsworkpapers/17

Working Papers
on
Multiculturalism

■ TH
MULTIC
DEPARTMEN

HE CENTRE FOR
M u l t ic u l t u r a l

s t u d ie s

P ap er N o. 19

The Challenge of
Multiculturalism:
Global Changes and
Australian Experiences
CA STLES

Working Papers on Multiculturalism No. 19

The Challenge of
Multiculturalism
Global Changes and Australian Experiences

Stephen Castles
Centre for Multicultural Studies
University of Wollongong, Australia

Published for

The Office of Multicultural Affairs, Department of the Prime
Minister and Cabinet,
by
The Centre for Multicultural Studies, University of Wollongong,
Australia

©

1992 Office of Multicultural Affairs

Published by
The Centre for Multicultural Studies
University of Wollongong
Northfield Avenue
Wollongong NSW 2522
Australia
Ph. (042) 213 780 Fax. (042) 286313
for
The Office of Multicultural Affairs
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
3-5 National Circuit
Barton ACT 2600
Australia
Co-ordination: Bill Cope, Adriana Hassapis and Colleen Mitchell (CMS);
Lucyna McDermott and Brenda Jackson (OMA);
Penny Crittle (Centre for Workplace Communication and Culture, UTS ).
Additional copies of this report are available from the CMS, University of Wollongong,.
Price: $20.00 each, including postage and packing. Mail, fax or phone order to the above
address.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Commonwealth Government, the Office of Multicultural Affairs or the Centre
for Multicultural Studies, University of Wollongong.
National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication Data:
Castles, Stephen.
The challenge of multiculturalism : global changes and
Australian experiences.
Bibliography.
ISBN 0 642 18233 7.
1. Pluralism (Social sciences) - Australia. 2. Pluralism (Social
sciences). 3. Emigration and immigration. 4. Australia Emigration and immigration. I. Australia. Office of
Multicultural Affairs. II. University of Wollongong. Centre
for Multicultural Studies. ( Series : Working papers
on multiculturalism; no. 19).
325.94
SERIES ISSN 1035-8129
Text printing and binding by the University of Wollongong Printery (042) 21 3999
Covers printed by Meglamedia (02) 519 1044

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: AUSTRALIAN MULTICULTURALISM...Page 7
Migration to Australia
Current Immigration Policy
The Emergence of Multiculturalism
Multiculturalism as a Public Policy
Problems of the Australian Model
Conclusion
References

CHAPTER 2: THE AUSTRALIAN MODEL OF IMMIGRATION
AND MULTICULTURALISM: IS IT APPLICABLE TO
EUROPE?...Page 25
The Australian Model and Western Europe
Planning and Strict Control of Entries by the Government
Entry Policy Marked by Non-Discrimination on the Basis of Race, Ethnicity and
National Origin, but Selectivity According to Economic and Social Criteria
Rapid Access to Citizenship and Other Formal Rights
Active Social Policies and Special Agencies to Deal with the Educational,
Social and Economic Needs of Immigrants
Acceptance of Cultural Pluralism, within Carefully Defined Limits
References

CHAPTER 3: MIGRATIONS AND MINORITIES IN EUROPE:
PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 1990'S: TWELVE HYPOTHESES.. .Page 32
The Twelve Hypotheses
Conclusion
References

CHAPTER 4: ITALIANS IN AUSTRALIA: THE IMPACT OF A
RECENT MIGRATION ON THE CULTURE AND SOCIETY OF A
POST-COLONIAL NATION.. .Page 56
Italian Immigration and Settlement
The C olonial Period
The P ostw ar Immigration Program
Patterns o f Settlement
Italo-Australians Today: a Statistical Overview
Work and Social Mobility
The Italo-Australian Community
Italian Settlement and Australian Multiculturalism
Italo-Australians on the Pacific Rim
References

,

CHAPTER 5: GLOBAL WORKFORCE NEW RACISM AND THE
DECLINING NATION STATE...Page 84
Introduction
Labour Migration and the Development of a Global Workforce
Western Europe
The USA
Oil-Producing Countries
The N eivly-Industrialising Countries (NICs)
The Changing Role of Migrant Labour in Developed Countries
Ethnic Minorities and New Racism
Immigration, Citizenship and Nation: a Comparison of Australia and the
Federal Republic of Germany
Econom ic and Social Factors in the Form ation o f Ethnic M inorities
Institutional and Legal Arrangements Towards Ethnic Minorities
A ttitudes and Behaviour Towards M inorities
The Reconstitution o f Culture and Identity by Ethnic M inorities
Multiculturalism and the Nation
Conclusion
References

Chapter 1 is based on a paper delivered to the Hellenic Studies Forum in
Melbourne, Australia, 27-30th March 1992.
Chapter 2 is an excerpt from a paper delivered to the Conference on the New
Europe and International Migration in Turin, Italy, 25-28th November 1991. The
full paper appears in International M igration Review , Vol. 25,1992.
Chapter 3 is based on a paper delivered to the Conference on Racism and Migration
in Europe in the 1990s in Warwick, England, 20-22nd September 1991.
Chapter 4 is based on a paper delivered to the International Conference on 500
Years of Italian Immigration to the Americas in New York, USA, 27-29th May
1992.
Chapter 5 is based on a paper delivered to the Kongress: Migration und Rassismus
in Europa in Hamburg, Germany, 27-30th September 1990.

CHAPTER 1

AUSTRALIAN
MULTICULTURALISM

The aim of this paper is to examine the experience of Australia with regard to
immigration and migrant settlement since 1945, and to discuss the model of
multiculturalism which has emerged as a way of shaping social policy and
national identity in an increasingly diverse society. Australia is widely regarded
as a 'classical country of immigration'. Indeed, apart from Aborigines and Torres
Strait Islanders who make up approximately 2 per cent of the population, the
whole Australian people can trace their origins back to the immigrations which
started with British colonization in 1788. Immigration has always been a central
part of nation-building in Australia. Since 1945, there has been a planned program
of mass immigration. Today, one in five Australians are immigrants or children of
immigrants, and the country is one of the most ethnically diverse in the world.

Migration to Australia
After 1788, the Australian colonies developed as a white settler society, closely
linked to Britain, and integrated into the economic system of the Empire. The
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population was partially destroyed,
dispossessed and socially marginalized. A new population, both of convict or free
origin, was brought in with a high measure of state planning and control. Ever since
1788, governments (initially the British colonial administration, later the
Australian federal and state governments) have recruited, subsidized or encouraged
immigrants, have made efforts to select suitable entrants, and have provided
various special services for settlers (DIEA, 1986). This tradition of state
intervention makes immigration a central area of public policy.

Prior to the Second World War, the overwhelming majority of settlers came from
Britain. European minority groups such as the Irish, Germans and Italians often
encountered hostility and discrimination (de Lepervanche, 1975). But racism was
strongest against non-European immigrants, particularly the Chinese, who came in

response to the Gold Rushes of the 1850s, and South Pacific Islanders, recruited as
cheap labour by plantation owners in the late 19th century. There was a close link
between racism and the emerging feeling of Australian nationhood (MacQueen,
1975). The 'yellow peril' of Asian invasion was a persistent image of Australian
popular culture. One of the first laws passed by the new Federal Parliament in 1901
was the Immigration Restriction Act, designed to exclude non-Europeans, which
was to remain in force until the 1970s.

After the Second World War the Australian Government set up a Department of
Immigration. Policy-makers believed that Australia's population of 7.5 million
needed to be increased both for economic and strategic reasons. Immigration levels
have been high throughout the post-war period, ranging from a minimum of about
50,000 settlers per year to a maximum of 185,000 settlers. Net migration has
accounted for about 40 per cent of the growth in population to currently about 17
million (NPC, 1991: 21). About five million people from some 100 countries have
come to Australia as settlers since 1945 (BIR, 1990: 32). In 1947, nearly 90 per cent of
the population were Australian-born, and most of the rest were from the UK. By
1986, the Australian-born share had fallen to 79 per cent, while 21 per cent of the
population were overseas-born. Just over half of these are of non-English speaking
background (NESB), which is the usual official label for cultural distinctiveness.
Moreover, 20 per cent of the Australian-born had at least one immigrant parent.
Immigrants and their immediate descendants make up a higher proportion of the
population than in any other developed country.

This shift from relative homogeneity to great diversity was not the intention of the
post-war immigration program. When it started, Immigration Minister Calwell
promised the Australian public that there would be ten British immigrants for
every 'foreigner'. It was widely believed that non-British immigration would
threaten national identity and social cohesion (Borrie, 1947; Wilton and Bosworth,
1984). But once it had become clear that immigration from Britain would be
insufficient to sustain demographic and economic growth, the Australian
Government looked elsewhere. In the late 1940s the Department of Immigration
recruited in Displaced Persons Camps in Europe, giving preference to refugees from
Baltic and Slavonic countries, who were perceived as both 'racially acceptable'
and anti-communist. Altogether 180,000 eastern Europeans migrated to Australia
from 1947 and 1951, making up 37 per cent of migrants in those years (Collins, 1988:
24). There was also considerable immigration from Germany, the Netherlands and
Scandinavia.
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By the 1950s the Cold War virtually stopped eastern European migration, while
economic revival in northern Europe gradually reduced movements from that region.
There was great reluctance to admit southern Europeans, who were seen as
culturally different and politically suspect, due to the strength of the communist
parties of Italy and Greece. Some commentators saw northern but not southern
Italians as assimilable (Vasta, 1990). But the pressing need for labour led to
recruitment agreements with most southern European countries. In the 1950s and
1960s most migrants came from Italy, Greece and Malta.

A two-class system of immigration developed: British migrants, and many northern
Europeans too, were given assisted passages, could bring their families at once and
had full labour-market and civil rights upon arrival. Those from eastern and
southern Europe were less likely to get an assisted passage, had no automatic right
to family reunion, were frequently directed into undesirable jobs and were generally
treated as inferior (Collins, 1988: 23-4). But there was a third, invisible, class:
those who were not admitted at all. The White Australia Policy kept out all non
whites, and was applied so zealously that even the Asian wives of Australian
soldiers who had served overseas were excluded.

Immigration remained high throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and was widely seen
as a major cause of Australia's prosperity. By the late 1960s it was becoming hard to
attract southern European workers, and many were returning to their homelands.
The result was a series of measures to attract and retain migrants: further
liberalisation of family reunion, recruitment in Yugoslavia and Latin America, and
some relaxation of the White Australia Policy.1 But when the world recession of
the 1970s hit Australia, the first reaction of the Australian Labor Party (ALP)
Government was to reduce immigration (the average level was 56,000 per year from
1971 to 1976). It also finally abolished the White Australia Policy, introducing
entry criteria which did not discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion or
national origin.^ The succeeding Liberal-Country Party Government increased
immigration to around 100,000 per year in the late 1970s and early 1980s. At the

1

The move away from in racism in immigration policy was matched by trends towards
improving the formal status of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, who were granted
citizenship for the first time following a referendum in 1967. However, the economic and
social situation of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders remains disastrous today, a
theme which cannot be dealt with in this paper.

2

Entry rules which are formally non-discriminatory do not necessarily exclude informal
discrimination in the administrative practices through which they are implemented.
There is no space to examine this issue in the present paper.
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same time, the Indo-Chinese crisis led to the arrival of refugee boats from Vietnam.
To prevent spontaneous and potentially uncontrollable entries of boat-people, Prime
Minister Fraser agreed to join the international relief effort. This led to the
planned entry of large numbers of Vietnamese refugees, soon followed by refugees
from the Civil War in Lebanon. By 1980,22 per cent of new immigrants were Asians
(Collins, 1988: 26). Australian openness to family reunion quickly led to enduring
patterns of chain migration from these areas.

Current Immigration Policy
Recent immigration levels have fluctuated according to economic conditions and
government policies. They were low (60,000-100,000) in the recession of the early
1980s and high in the period of economic growth in late 1980s (up to 140,000 per
year). In the current recession, immigration has declined somewhat, and there are
calls for considerable cuts to economic migration. This contrasts with recent
decisions in the USA and Canada, where skilled migration is being sharply
increased. The Australian debate is marked by a short-term perspective, and a lack
of forward planning: if skilled entries are cut now, the delays in processing built
into the selection system will mean that the actual cuts in entries will come just in
time to create skilled labour bottlenecks as economic recovery begins.

Immigration from Asia (particularly south-east Asia and the Indian sub-continent)
is now the largest component of entry, making up 35-45 per cent of total intakes.
However, entries from the UK and New Zealand also remain high. From 1988-91 a
total of 388,000 settlers entered Australia. The top ten countries of origin were:

UK and Ireland

(75,000)

New Zealand

(42,000)

Hong Kong

(29,000)

Malaysia

(20,000)

China

(19,000)

Vietnam

(32,000)

Philippines

(22,000)

India

(11,000)

South Africa

(5,000).

Sri Lanka

(6,000)

In late 1991, an Asian country, Hong Kong, for the first time overtook the UK as the
largest single source country for immigrants. Relatively few western Europeans
(apart from the British) have come to Australia in recent years. However there
was considerable Polish immigration in the early 1980s. More recently, the end of
Soviet domination in eastern Europe has led to contradictory trends: on the one
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hand, some eastern European settlers of the post-war period—or their
descendants—have opted to return; on the other hand, there has been an upsurge in
applications for migration to Australia at consulates in the Soviet Union and other
Eastern European countries. A new wave of eastern European migration seems
possible.

A detailed discussion of the complex legal, institutional and administrative
framework which regulates immigration and settlement is not possible here (see
CAAIP, 1988; Castles, 1989), however, some central features should be noted.
Immigration levels are decided upon annually by the Federal Government. Program
implementation is the responsibility of the Department of Immigration, Local
Government and Ethnic Affairs (DILGEA). Prospective immigrants apply to
Australian consulates abroad, where they may be interviewed by Immigration
Officers. Medical and occupational tests may also take place. Currently about one
million people apply each year, of whom about 100,000 are successful. There are
three main immigration categories:

—

Family Migration, the largest category, since all permanent immigrants
have rights to family reunion. The Immediate Family (spouse and
children) are admitted automatically, while more distant relatives
(siblings, parents, etc) are assessed according to a Points System. In 198990 the Program Target for Immediate Family was 41,000 and for Extended
Family 30,000. The total in the Family category was 71,000.

—

Economic Migration. This is sub-divided into various sub-categories, such
as Business Migration (Program Target 1989-90,10,000), Employer
Nominations (11,000), Independents (i.e. individual applicants assessed
on the Points System: 23,500) and the Occupational Shares System (i.e.
occupations classified as in demand in Australia: 9,000). The total in the
Economic category was 54,000.

—

Humanitarian Migration. This comprises refugees selected in cooperation
with the UNHCR in refugee camps (e.g. Vietnamese in Thailand) as
well as some 'in-country humanitarian applicants' selected in their
country of origin (e.g in El Salvador). There is also a relatively small but
growing number of people who apply for refugee status when already in
Australia on temporary entry permits. The Program Target for this
category was 14,000 in 1989-90.
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Economic migration makes up less than half the total intake. It is this component
which is easiest to reduce in times of recession. Economic migration generates future
chains of migration, due to the rights to family reunion. This also applies to the
other categories: refugees can bring in their dependents just like other migrants,
while people admitted through family reunion can then bring in further family
members. The Points Test, used for several categories, is based on a model developed
in Canada, and was first introduced in 1973. In the current version, points are
awarded for work skills, age, language skills, and family relationships with
residents or citizens of Australia. The Points System is complex and hard to apply
fairly. It is not discriminatory on racial, ethnic, religious or political criteria, but it
does discriminate in favour of young, economically productive people who have
been able to receive a good education. It tends to select either people from highlydeveloped countries or an elite from less-developed countries, thus encouraging the
'brain drain'.

The Australian immigration system has always been based on the primacy of
permanent immigration of potential citizens. However, in recent years the number
of temporary entrants has grown. These are made up of students and trainees, as
well as temporary workers with special skills, often moving within the framework
of transnational companies. There is a certain slippage from temporary into
permanent immigration, through the possibility of applying for transfer to
permanent status.

The Emergence of Multiculturalism
The post-war immigration program was designed to maintain the integrity of
Anglo-Australia, but in fact achieved the opposite, bringing about great ethnic
diversity. The initial solution to this dilemma was found in assimilationism: the
doctrine that immigrants could be culturally and socially absorbed, and rapidly
become indistinguishable from the existing Anglo-Australian population (Wilton
and Bosworth, 1984). Government measures to encourage successful settlement
included some special services: provision of initial accommodation and basic
English courses, help in finding work, and support for voluntary efforts such as
'Good Neighbour Councils' (Jakubowicz, 1989). But the centrepiece of
assimilationism was to treat most migrants as future citizens, who were to live and
work with Anglo-Australians. Naturalisation could be obtained after five years,
later reduced to three and then two years, and children born to immigrants
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automatically became Australian citizens. Immigrants had the right to bring in
family members, but there was no special educational provision for migrant
children. (Martin, 1978; DIEA, 1986; Vasta, 1990). Cultural pluralism and the
formation of 'ethnic ghettoes' was to be avoided at all costs.

By the 1960s, it was obvious that assimilationism was not working. The situation of
migrant workers was marked by labour market segmentation and social segregation.
Migrants settled in the industrial suburbs and the inner-city areas close to their
work, where housing was relatively cheap. Many migrants were living in isolation
and relative poverty (Martin, 1978). Migrant children were failing at school, often
due to lack of support in learning English. The result was a series of social policy
measures including an Integration Branch within the Department of Immigration,
immigrant welfare grants for community agencies, a Committee on Overseas
Professional Qualifications, a special law providing for English courses for
children and adults, English language courses on television and at the workplace,
and the first steps towards a Telephone Interpreter Service (DIEA, 1986: 31).

From about 1970, immigrants began to be perceived as a political factor, since they
made up a significant proportion of working class voters. The ALP set up Greek and
Italian sections, advertised in the ethnic press and selected some migrants as
candidates (Collins, 1988: 135-7). The victory of the ALP in the 1972 election, after
23 years of conservative government, seems to have been partly attributable to this
policy. ALP Immigration Minister Grassby spoke of multiculturalism and explicitly
rejected assimilation, seeing the increased diversity of society as a cultural and
economic enrichment. However, the emphasis in ALP policies was not on cultural
pluralism but on improving welfare and education systems (Castles et ah, 1990: 59).
Specific measures included the right to invalid and widows pensions, migrant
housing and low-interest loans, family health insurance, and work-based child
care programs employing workers of appropriate ethnic backgrounds, (Jakubowicz
et ah, 1984: 60-1).

When the Liberal-Country Party Coalition was re-elected in 1975, Prime Minister
Fraser went to considerable lengths to win the support of ethnic community leaders.
The Fraser government set out to redefine multiculturalism by emphasising cultural
pluralism and the role of ethnic organisations in provision of welfare services.
Fraser stressed the value of multiculturalism as a way of achieving social cohesion
in an ethnically diverse society. The bodies set up to produce and disseminate
'multicultural attitudes' (Foster and Stockley, 1988: 31) included the Australian
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Institute of Multicultural Affairs (AIMA), and the Special Broadcasting Service,
which was to provide multicultural television and radio services. The Adult
Migration Education Program was expanded, and a Multicultural Education
Program was developed for schools.

Welfare polices towards migrants were reshaped to fit into the neo-liberal agenda
of cutting government expenditure and privatising welfare. The problems
encountered by migrants were defined as individual deficiencies, resulting from
poor English, lack of knowledge of Australian institutions, or failure to adapt to an
industrial society. Migrant welfare was removed from the mainstream social
system, and delegated to the ethnic group, through a system of grants to ethnic
organisations.1 This provided welfare on the cheap, since pay, staffing levels and
conditions could be lower than in government agencies (Jakubowicz et al., 1984: 81).
Such funding gave government the opportunity of deciding which ethnic
organisations to recognise, a useful form of political patronage, which tended to
strengthen the role of traditionalist leaders.

The Hawke ALP Government, which was elected in 1983, initially continued the
multicultural policies of the previous government. However, as Australia's
economic perspectives became more uncertain, people began to question the benefits
of immigration and multiculturalism. The 'Great Immigration Debate' started in
1984, with public calls for restricting immigration, particularly from Asia, and
press campaigns against alleged high expenditures on multicultural programs. The
campaign quickly took on racist overtones, reminiscent of the 'yellow peril' slogan
of the past (Blainey, 1984; Markus and Ricklefs, 1985; Castles et al., 1990: 116-38).
The Government began to believe that there was diminishing support for
multiculturalism, and in 1986 abolished the Australian Institute of Multicultural
Affairs, and cut funding for English as a Second Language teaching and for the
Multicultural Education Program. Plans were also made to merge the Special
Broadcasting Service with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. However,
these cuts led to an ethnic mobilisation which threatened the ALP hold on
marginal seats in Sydney and Melbourne. In an amazingly rapid about-turn, many of
the measures of 1986 were reversed in early 1987. New policies and institutions
were introduced to strengthen and re-define multiculturalism.

1

The costs of these were more than defrayed by the 1978 decision to abolish tax rebates on
remittances to migrants' dependents overseas (Castles et al., 1990:68).
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Multiculturalism as a Public Policy
Today the ALP Government emphasises the economic benefits of multiculturalism,
arguing that a multicultural population is better placed to respond to the
challenges of increased international trade and communication, and above all to
provide the opening to Asia which is seen as crucial to Australia's future. The
National Policy on Languages, which was adopted in 1987 (Lo Bianco, 1987), has
the aim of encouraging bilingualism, including the learning of 'languages of
economic and strategic significance' as well as maintaining the 'community
languages' of migrant groups. In the social policy area, the government has argued
the need to move away from services for specific ethnic groups. The slogan of
'mainstreaming', introduced in the mid 1980s by the New South Wales Government,
has been generally adopted as a principle for restructuring government services. All
Commonwealth Government departments are now required to produce annual
'Access and Equity statements' designed to ensure that their services are responsive
to the needs of a diverse population.

The most significant statement of the new approach to multiculturalism is
contained in the National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia (OMA, 1989),
launched by the Prime Minister in 1989. The National Agenda identifies 'three
dimensions of multicultural policy':

—

cultural identity: the right of all Australians, within carefully defined
limits, to express and share their individual cultural heritage, including
their language and religion;

—

social justice: the right of all Australians to equality of treatment and
opportunity, and the removal of barriers of race, ethnicity, culture,
religion, language, gender or place of birth; and

—

economic efficiency: the need to maintain, develop and utilise effectively
the skills and talents of all Australians, regardless of background.

In the National Agenda (OMA, 1989), multiculturalism is essentially seen as a
system of rights and freedoms, which, however, are limited by an overriding
commitment to the nation, a duty to accept the Constitution and the rule of law, and
the acceptance of basic principles such as tolerance and equality, English as the
national language and equality of the sexes. Multiculturalism is not defined in
terms of cultural pluralism or minority rights, but in terms of the cultural, social
and economic rights of all citizens in a democratic state. The program contained in
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the document is based on the recognition that some groups are disadvantaged by
lack of language proficiency and education, together with discrimination based on
race, ethnicity, gender, etc.

A variety of special institutions and arrangements have been established to
implement multiculturalism. At the central government level, policies are
coordinated by the Office of Multicultural Affairs in the Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet. OMA has a wide-ranging brief, which includes monitoring
bills and cabinet submissions, vetting departmental Access and Equity Statements,
and publicly promoting multicultural policies and good community relations. The
Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (DILGEA) is
responsible for a range of settlement services, including the Adult Migrant
Education Program (mainly responsible for English courses); the Grant-in-Aid
system of support to migrant welfare organisations; and the Telephone Interpreter
Service, which provides interpreters for all languages throughout Australia.
DILGEA also funds a quasi-autonomous Bureau of Immigration Research.

Several other departments have special sections concerned with multicultural
issues. For instance, the Department of Employment, Education and Training has a
National Office for Overseas Skills Recognition, is involved in implementation of
the National Languages Policy, and shares responsibility with the state education
authorities for migrant and multicultural education. Finally, the Federal
Government continues to finance the Special Broadcasting Service, which provides
radio and television broadcasts in English and other languages to meet the needs of
ethnic communities, and to promote wider cultural understanding.

Most states have ethnic affairs commissions (EACs) or offices, which have a role
similar to that of OMA: they advise the state government, vet new laws, try to
make state government services more accessible to members of all ethnic groups,
coordinate language services, and generally promote good community relations.
State education, health and community services departments generally have
multicultural units to provide interpreting and translation services, and to plan
service delivery. There are units to deal with specific problems affecting NESB
people, such as recognition of overseas qualifications, aged care, occupational
health, women's issues, and drug and alcohol dependency.

Multiculturalism is a major focus for a number of non-governmental bodies, such as
the Ethnic Communities Councils and their federal body, the Federation of Ethnic
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Communities Councils of Australia (FECCA). There are multicultural or ethnic
affairs units in bodies such as the Australian Council of Trade Unions. Special non
governmental agencies (generally subsidised from public funds) are concerned with
provision of information and counselling, or improving services for particular
groups, such as migrant women and youth. However, multiculturalism is above all a
public policy issue, which has not played a major part in the private sector. The
private bodies in the area function essentially as pressure groups, calling on
government to improve resources and services.

Problems of the Australian Model
The preceding account can be summed up by pointing to the central features of the
Australian model for immigration and ethnic relations:

—

planning and strict control of entries by the government;

—

entry policy marked by non-discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity
and national origin, but selectivity according to economic and social
criteria;

—

rapid access to citizenship and other formal rights;

—

active social policies and special agencies to deal with the educational,
social and economic needs of immigrants;

—

acceptance of cultural pluralism, within carefully defined limits.

Australian multiculturalism appears to be a necessary consequence of mass
immigration and growing cultural diversity, which has forced the state to re
examine social policies, and to address the consequences of diversity for community
relations and national identity. On the whole, the Australian model appears to be
fairly successful. It has allowed the efficient management of a migratory movement
of great magnitude (relative to the size of the receiving population). It has
provided rapid access to citizenship to people of very varied origins. It has
facilitated processes of dramatic demographic, social and cultural change with
surprisingly little social tension. Multiculturalism accepts the legitimacy of
linguistic and cultural maintenance, and of ethnic community organisations, helping
to provide the first and second generation of immigrants with the security and self
esteem necessary for a high degree of social participation at both the individual
and collective levels. Finally, multiculturalism has permitted a shift from an
explicitly racist and isolationist notion of national identity to a much more open
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society, more capable of facing up to the new realities of its position in the AsianPacific region.

However, the Australian model of immigration and multiculturalism has a number
of problems and contradictions. Firstly, it should be noted that the essential factor
which has made the tightly-controlled entry system possible is Australia's
geography: the relative remoteness and the surrounding ocean have made entry
regulations easy to enforce. The significance of this seems likely to decline in future:
factors which increase the propensity to migrate to Australia, and make it harder
to police movements include improvements in transportation, increasing mobility of
capital and labour in the Pacific region, the growth in temporary movements, the
establishment of migrant chains and the existence of ethnic communities within
Australia. If strict entry control is the price which migrants to Australia have to
pay for a generous system of rights once they get in, then both sides of the equation
may soon look shaky.

Secondly, Australian multiculturalism is based on notions of culture and ethnicity
which have changed over time, and which are often not coherent and clear. The
first approach to multiculturalism—that of the ALP Government of 1972-75—was
essentially concerned with the economic and social rights of migrant workers.
Eastern or southern European origin was conceptualized not in cultural terms, but as
a marker of class position. This was consistent both with the political ideas of the
ALP and with the fact that the majority of migrants at that time were people of
peasant origin, who had become manual workers in industry. The Liberal-Country
Party Government of 1975-82 based its approach to multiculturalism on a
primordialist concept of culture, seen in static terms as the language, folklore,
cuisine and customs brought in as 'cultural baggage' by immigrants. The ethnic group
was regarded as a relatively homogeneous community with its own 'natural'
leaders, whose mainly traditionalist representation of ethnic culture transcended
class. Multiculturalism was thus concerned with cultural maintenance and
pluralism, although within the framework of the 'overarching values' of
Australian society (Zubrzycki, 1977; Smolicz, 1985), which were also seen in static
and homogeneous terms. This model also fitted well with the privatisation ethos
of neo-liberal social policy, since welfare provision could be delegated to ethnic
community organisations.

The current approach, as summed up in the National Agenda (OMA, 1989) moves
away from this static view of culture and ethnicity. Cultural identity and
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diversity are now seen as legitimate attributes of all citizens and residents—part of
the private sphere, which is not to be promoted, but certainly to be protected, by
the state. Thus cultural rights are not seen as pluralism, let alone separatism, but as
an aspect of citizenship, to be restricted only where they infringe other rights, such
as the rule of law, tolerance of others, or equality of the sexes. The shift from a
pluralist ethnic group model to an inclusionary multicultural one is in part a result
of the development of the migratory process: away from a rural-urban movement, to
a much more complex situation including upwardly mobile second and third
generations, as well as new immigrants of more diverse ethnic, social and
educational backgrounds (Jayasuriya, 1990). However, although the conceptual
framework has shifted in response to such developments, it is neither coherent nor
universally accepted. There is no clear notion of the relationship between ethnicity
and other dimensions of inequality—above all class and gender. Nor is there any
clarity about the long-term perspectives for cultural difference and ethnic identity
within Australia. It is not surprising then, that actual policies and practices have
a contradictory and transitional nature, containing elements of the previous
approaches.

Thirdly, the multicultural definition of citizenship in The National Agenda
appears to leave no role for specific social policies for ethnic minorities. But in
practice there is still a wide range of specialised services and agencies, and ethnic
organisations lobby for their continuation and improvement. There is a very real
problem here: basing service delivery on ethnicity tends to segregate and
marginalize migrants, but ignoring ethnicity and catering for migrants only within
general services can mean neglecting special needs and perpetuating structural
discrimination. In any case there is a big gap between the ideology of equity and
the real persistence of inequality and social marginalization. People who belong to
certain ethnic groups (particularly southern Europeans, Latin Americans, Lebanese,
Turks and Indo-Chinese) tend to have lower occupational status, lower incomes,
higher unemployment rates and a variety of special health and educational needs
(DIEA, 1986; ABS, 1989). Ethnicity is therefore still a marker of class position for
certain groups.

Fourthly, the ethnic group model which emerged in the late 1970s provided a
recognised socio-political role for ethnic associations, which put a premium on the
construction of culturally-based definitions of needs. Indeed it has been argued that
pluralist models of welfare delivery actually helped to construct a special form of
ethnicity, and the organisations and leaderships which went along with it
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(Castles et a l, 1990: chapter 4; Jakubowicz et a l, 1984). Such leaderships have an
interest in presenting a view of homogeneous and relatively permanent ethnic
communities, with common needs. Although this concept of the ethnic community is
becoming increasingly questionable, and does not match the current approach to
multiculturalism, the government cannot ignore the political influence of ethnic
organisations. Thus despite the emphasis on rights of 'all Australians' in the
National Agenda, OMA, DILGEA and other government bodies continue to subsidise
ethnic organisations in a variety of ways.

Fifthly, major Australian institutions in both the public and private sectors are
still based on British, US and—to a lesser extent—western European models. Their
structure and organisational culture tend to disadvantage people who show
differences in appearance, speech, behaviour or values from positions of power. The
political task of changing central institutions to truly reflect a multicultural society
has yet to be undertaken.

Finally, immigration and multicultural policies remain controversial. There is
considerable public debate about levels of immigration, forms of selection,
expenditure on special services, the meaning of multiculturalism and the effects of
cultural pluralism on social relations and national identity. Although the major
political parties all support immigration and multiculturalism, they differ
considerably on the detailed public policies this entails. The public debate
frequently takes on racist overtones, evoking spectres of being 'swamped' by mass
immigration from Asia. Although there are no riots (like in Britain) and little
organised racist violence (as in Germany), there is considerable evidence of racism,
taking the form of abuse, harassment and even physical violence, particularly
against Asians1 (HREOC, 1991). Multiculturalism still has a long way to go before
it secures universal support.

1

Racist violence and discrimination is most severe against Aborigines and Torres Strait
Islanders. The HREOC Report on Racist Violence (1991) found that such practices were
widespread and institutionalized, and that the perpetrators were frequently police
officers and other officials. This will not be discussed in the present paper.
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Conclusion
Australia has become a society of great cultural and ethnic diversity in a very short
period. The high level of government intervention in immigration policy has been
carried over into the areas of settlement and ethnic relations. In this Australia is
very similar to Canada, but unlike the USA, where the integration of immigrants
has been largely left to market forces. Multiculturalism has emerged as a formula
for managing both social policy and identity, and has played a central part in the
successful model for immigrant settlement and community relations.
Multiculturalism has changed considerably in recent years. In the late 1970s, its
language was of 'enrichment' through diversity and 'dignity' through cultural
maintenance. The focus on cultural pluralism matched both the social policy
priorities of the conservative government, and the interests of mainly middle-class
leaderships seeking to articulate the demands of first generation European
immigrant workers. The experience which transcended class difference was the
cultural isolation and social marginalization resulting from assimilationism;
multiculturalism set out above all to redress this. Today, cultural pluralism has
lost its central role as a minority demand, partly through changes in the economic
and political context, partly through changes in the make-up of the NESB
population, and partly because multiculturalism itself has demonstrated that
formal acceptance of diversity does not in itself necessarily improve the position of
minorities.

The first generation southern and eastern European cultural brokers are therefore
losing their leadership role, although ethnic organisations remain significant, and
governments continue to stress cultural rights. The new leaders are of Asian as well
as European origin, and belong mainly to the second generation, i.e. they are of
NESB migrant parentage. They have been educated in Australia, understand the
system well, and are often employed within the bureaucracy. They articulate the
needs of ethnic minorities not in cultural but in bureaucratic terms, as expressed in
the catch-words of Access and Equity. These new leaderships still make use of
cultural markers, in order to maintain links with their constituency. The concept of
the ethnic community, as a social category which transcends both class and
generation, is crucial to their position.

The location of this new NESB leadership group is contradictory: they belong both
to the ethnic communities (which they construct and mobilise) and to the state (for
which they work in one way or another). This contradiction reflects the tensions
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within multiculturalism, which is both a public policy designed to manage
diversity, and a way of articulating minority interests. Similarly, the current form
of multiculturalism embodies the potential conflict between an inclusionary
declaration of civil, political and social citizenship for all, and a pluralist model
based on ethnic groups as interest groups. A further tension exists between the
guarantee of the right of minorities to be culturally and linguistically different,
and their exclusion from positions of real power if they exercise that right.

Multiculturalism is likely to be a central element of Australian public policy for
the foreseeable future. But it has yet to reach a stable and coherent form. Further
controversy and change are therefore likely. Considerable work is still needed
before multiculturalism can provide a satisfactory framework for social policy and
for national identity, in a period when Australia needs to both reshape its internal
economic and social structures and to re-orient its international relations.
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CHAPTER 2

THE AUSTRALIAN MODEL
OF IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURALISM
IS IT APPLICABLE TO EUROPE?

The very centrality of immigration to Australian society has been a reason why
many European observers have seen no relevance in a comparison, arguing that their
own countries are 'not countries of immigration', but merely places of sojourn for
temporary labour migrants from the European periphery. Today, however, the
myth of temporary migration is breaking down, and the reality of permanent
settlement and the formation of new ethnic minorities can no longer be denied
(Castles et al., 1984; Castles, 1986). Moreover, new types of 'South-North' and
'E ast-W est'1 migration are rapidly growing in significance. Immigration and
growing cultural diversity now present major challenges to European societies. In
this situation, the policies and practices of 'classical countries of immigration' may
prove increasingly useful.

The Australian Model and Western Europe
How relevant is the Australian experience to current problems in western Europe? It
is impossible to present a comparative description of the migratory process in
various European countries here. There have been two main types of immigration:
migration from colonies or former colonies to the colonial power, and migration of
workers from the European periphery to the industrial economies of North-West
Europe, often within the framework of 'guestworker' systems. Although there were
many differences between these types of migration, there have also been important
similarities and convergences. A large proportion of both 'colonial workers' and
1

It should be pointed out that these concepts are questionable from an Australian
perspective. Australia belongs geographically to the South, but culturally, economically
and politically to the North. Similarly, migrants from Eastern Europe move further East
when they come to Australia. Clearly the concepts of South-North and East-West
represent cultural, economic and political, rather than geographical locations.

'guestworkers' became incorporated into the economy as unskilled workers. Both
have tended to bear the brunt of economic restructuring and the urban crisis,
experiencing unemployment, poor housing and social conditions, and suffering the
racism of insecure sections of the local populations (Castles et al., 1984; Castles,
1986). Both 'colonial workers' and 'guestworkers' have been incorporated into
society as new ethnic minorities, which experience various degrees of insecurity and
exclusion (Hammar, 1985).

Improvements in the societal position of ethnic minorities, which were beginning to
be made during the late 1970s and early 1980s, now seem jeopardized by protective
reactions sparked off by the escalation of South-North migration in the late 1980s
and the current development of East-West movements (Alund and Schierup, 1991).
Clear distinctions between types of migration are breaking down, government
policies are increasingly difficult to implement (SOPEMI, 1990), and fears of
economic and social tensions are growing. Immigration and ethnic diversity are
forcing Europeans to re-examine their social policies, political institutions, cultures
and national identities. There is a marked tendency towards exclusionary policies,
particularly towards non-Europeans, and this in turn increases hostility towards
existing minorities.

Similarities between Western Europe and Australia include:
—

large-scale immigration and settlement since 1945, with increasing
numbers of non-European migrants in recent years;

—

institutional and informal practices which initially concentrated certain
groups of migrants in manual employment, leading to marked
segmentation of the labour market according to ethnicity and gender;

—

residential concentration in urban areas, affected by housing problems
and poor infrastructure, where competition and conflict with local people
develop;

—

the growing significance of racist discourses, which use the presence of
minorities as an explanation of economic and social problems, and
advocate exclusion and discrimination.

The differences include:
—

geographical factors which still permit a high degree of government
control of migration to Australia compared with the increasing difficulty
of controlling national borders in Europe;

—

larger relative size of the immigrant population in Australia;
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—

the role of immigration in nation-building in Australia, compared with
the older established populations of European nations;

—

an immigration policy based on permanent family settlement in
Australia, compared with a policy still based on the myth of temporary
residence in some western European countries;

—

an inclusionary concept of the nation in Australia, where immigrants are
encouraged to become citizens and quickly gain access to all formal rights,
compared with exclusionary concepts of citizenship and nationhood
based on ethnicity in some European countries.

There are clearly important parallels, as well as significant differences between
Australia and western European countries. The question is: can some of the successful
elements of the Australian model be usefully applied in Europe, and what changes
are necessary to make them appropriate in the different context? To answer this, it
is useful to re-examine the central features of the Australian model for immigration
and ethnic relations, already mentioned in Chapter 1.

Planning and Strict Control of Entries by the Government
The price for a generous policy of rights for settlers in Australia, has been a high
measure of control of entries. Immigration levels and categories are worked out as a
balance between economic needs (e.g. labour demand, the need for specific skills),
the needs of ethnic communities (for family reunion) and international
responsibilities (e.g. burden sharing with regard to refugees). At present, there is a
tendency towards loss of control of migratory movements. It seems to me that this is
partly because some governments are trying to carry out policies which are
unrealistic and in conflict with economic, social and political realities. For
instance, in the German case, trying to maintain the fiction of not being 'a country of
immigration' at a time of very rapid immigration condemns public policy to
absurdity. An active immigration policy means setting out levels of immigration
which are realistic in view of internal and external pressures; striking a balance
between various types of migration (economic, family and refugee); and setting up
selection mechanisms which are as fair as possible. Such a policy would have to be
co-ordinated with policies on international relations, trade and development.
Migrations will take place whether governments want them or not, as the current
growth of illegal migration demonstrates. An active immigration policy will not
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solve this problem quickly or completely, but it is the only chance of maintaining
some measure of control of movements.

Entry Policy Marked by Non-Discrimination on the Basis of
Race, Ethnicity and National Origin, hut Selectivity
According to Economic and Social Criteria
There is currently a tendency in western Europe to favour East-West over SouthNorth migration. This is usually justified in economic terms (eastern Europeans are
seen as better educated and more productive), and cultural terms ('after all, we are
all Europeans'). These arguments lead, in the final analysis to racial and ethnic
discrimination. Moreover, they are likely to worsen the situation of existing nonEuropean minorities by defining them as intrinsically inferior and undesirable. The
Australian experience of moving from the racist selection criteria of the White
Australia policy to the current non-discriminatory is instructive here. At the
beginning of the post-war immigration program, the majority of Australians
believed that non-white immigration would lead to social conflict and the
breakdown of national identity. In fact the opening of Australia to non-white (i.e.
particularly Asian) immigration has not led to a breakdown of the social fabric, but
rather to considerable economic benefits and an enrichment of society. The lesson for
Europe is the need to remove any forms of discrimination on the basis of race,
ethnicity and national origin from immigration rules. This does not, however, mean
that there should be no selectivity: criteria of education, training, work experience,
age, etc. can be used in selecting entrants in the economic migration category, though
not for refugees or immediate family members.

Rapid Access to Citizenship and Other Formal Rights
Perhaps the most important single lesson of the Australian experience is the key
role of citizenship and of economic, social, political and cultural rights in bringing
about good community relations. The overwhelming majority of immigrants in
Australia have become citizens, while all children born in the country
automatically have citizenship. This gives them access to the political system and
the opportunity of participation in many social arenas. It also gives them a sense of
belonging, and the security necessary to develop long-term perspectives. This
security also makes immigrants less threatening to other social groups: since they
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have full labour-market rights, they are not forced to undercut wages or work in
clandestine situations. In western Europe, some employers (and even governments)
are willing to take advantage of the cheap labour provided by clandestine
migrants or refugees from less-developed countries, while denying them the right to
secure residence status. Similarly, policies which exclude permanent immigrants
from citizenship create a situation of marginalization which threatens good labour
relations and social peace, and which contradicts the principles of representative
democracy. In the long run there is no alternative to making citizenship available
to all permanent residents—it should be done sooner rather than later. The
argument often advanced against it—that many immigrants do not want to give up
their existing citizenship—is in fact a reason for accepting dual citizenship, or for
developing forms of latent citizenship, rather than denying it to permanent
residents.

Active Social Policies and Special Agencies to Deal with the
Educational, Social and Economic Needs of Immigrants
The Australian state provides support services for the settlement process, such as
reception centres for new arrivals, help in finding employment, language courses,
special educational support for immigrant children and translating and
interpreting services. Such services are seen as a central aspect of multiculturalism,
in accordance with the principle that all government agencies should make their
services appropriate and accessible to people of different ethnic backgrounds. They
are complemented by equal-opportunities and anti-discrimination laws, and
special agencies to implement these. Clearly, special services of various kinds
have also been introduced in all western European countries to help deal with
problems of immigration and settlement. The Australian experience is that it is
important to move away from piecemeal and ad hoc social policies in this area.
Multicultural social policy should be regarded as a long-term necessity, and not
simply a transitory part of the settlement process. Moreover, such measures should
be understood as citizenship rights, crucial to securing the full participation of
people of diverse ethnic backgrounds in a pluralist society.
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Acceptance of Cultural Pluralism, within Carefully Defined
Limits
Australia's post-war immigration program and the policy of assimilation were
designed to maintain cultural homogeneity. The emergence of multiculturalism was
a reaction to an unplanned development, but it has proved highly successful as a
way of maintaining good community relations in an ethnically diverse society.
Multiculturalism sets out to define the relationship between the cultural rights of
individuals and groups, and the rule of law in a secular society. In the National
Agenda for a Multicultural Australia (OMA, 1989), multiculturalism is set out not
in terms of minority rights, but as system of rights for all citizens in a democratic
state. In this understanding, multiculturalism is not a way of protecting possibly
repressive and separatist cultures, but a new statement of the division between the
public and the private in civil society. In Europe today, many people cling to the
idea of ethnic homogeneity, and want to turn the clock back to an imagined
monocultural community. They feel threatened by the idea of difference, and above
all by the possibility of loss of modernity and secularity, which seems to be
embodied in the perceived cultures of certain immigrant groups. Multicultural
policies based on the Australian model could provide a way of safeguarding the
cultural rights and specific interests of minority groups, while allaying the fears of
some members of the ethnic majorities.

In fact European societies have always been marked by migrations and cultural
interaction. Contemporary mass migrations, together with trends towards
globalization of economy and culture, are certain to bring about increased cultural
pluralism and ethnic diversity. Current tendencies towards exclusionism—the
'fortress Europe' mentality—and romantic and often violent attempts to return to an
illusory ethnic purity can do a great deal of harm, but they cannot permanently stop
the process of cultural change. In Australia, the very volume and diversity of
immigration, together with the changing position of the country in international
economic and political relations, have forced people to come to terms with such
realities, and to work out a blueprint for a multicultural society. The Australian
model is far from perfect: it contains unresolved contradictions and problems, and is
constantly changing. Nonetheless, my conclusion is that the Australia experience
can provide useful impulses—if not easy answers —for Europeans.
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CHAPTER 3

MIGRATIONS AND
MINORITIES IN EUROPE
PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 1990s:
TWELVE HYPOTHESES

This paper will not examine current migrations and the situation of ethnic
minorities in particular western European countries. Rather my aim is to look at
global patterns of migration and ethnic minority formation, and to relate these to
general tendencies in world political economy and cultural development. Then I
will examine the possible meaning of these trends for migrations and minorities in
western Europe, in particular with regard to government policies, racism,
citizenship and national identity. Finally, I will discuss some consequences: on the
one hand for the theoretical approaches and research methodology of social
scientists; on the other hand for the political demands and aims of the anti-racist
movement. In view of the very general and provisional nature of my considerations,
I will put them in the form of twelve hypotheses, which I will try to explain and
justify.

1. The world is entering a new phase of mass population
movements, in which migration to Europe and the situation
of ethnic minorities in Europe can only be fully understood
in a global context.
At the beginning of the 1980s, there was a widespread belief that mass migrations
to Western Europe had, for the time being, ended, allowing a phase of stabilisation
of immigrant populations. The stopping of labour migration to most countries
following the 'oil shock' of 1973-4, and the gradual completion of processes of
family re-union (despite attempts by some governments to prevent them), seemed to
provide conditions under which the 'new ethnic minorities' could settle and
establish

com munity

structures.

This

stabilisation

facilitated

gradual

improvement in the socio-economic situation and the civil and political rights of

immigrants. This was the context for debates on pluralism, multicultural policies
and measures against discrimination and racism.

The situation changed dramatically in the late 1980s. There was a rapid increase
in volume of migrations to North America1, Australia and Western Europe. There
was also growth in migrations concerning the countries of the South (SOPEMI,
1990), including rural-urban movements within less-developed countries (LDCs),
between various LDCs, from LDCs to newly-industrialising countries (NICs) and
between LDCs and oil countries. The 'new migrations' were new in areas of origin
and destination, with more and more countries and regions being drawn into
migratory relationships: for instance, the Southern European countries which had
experienced mass emigration until the early 1970s now became areas of immigration
from Africa and Asia. The migrations were new with regard to the characteristics
of migrants: for instance the increasing participation of women workers, and an
emerging polarisation of skills with both unskilled and very highly qualified
personnel participating. They were also new with regard to forms of migration:
former 'guestworker' countries now became the destinations of family migration and
refugee movements, while new 'guestworker systems' developed in the oil countries.
The overwhelming trend, however was towards spontaneous movements—
uncontrolled though not necessarily unwanted—by governments and employers, and
often taking the form of illegal or refugee movements.

At present there are estimated to be 80 million migrants (that is, people living
permanently or for long periods outside their countries of origin)—the equivalent of
1.7 per cent of world population. Thirty million of these are said to be in 'irregular
situations' and 15 million are refugees or asylum seekers (IOM, 1990). The new
trends are generally summed up in the catch-words South-North migration and,
most recently, East-West migration.2

1

In the case of the USA, the growth got under way following the new Immigration Act of
1965, which repealed the restrictive and racist measures which virtually stopped mass
immigration from the early 1920s.

2

It should be pointed out that these are Eurocentric terms. There are countries of the
Southern hemisphere (like Australia) which belong politically, economically and
culturally to the North and West, and which receive increasing numbers of migrants
both from Asia and Eastern Europe. Similarly, some countries of Europe (like Yugoslavia
and even Britain) are taking on some of the characteristics of LDCs, with regard to the
way they participate in the international division of labour.
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In the case of Western Europe the number of asylum-seekers increased throughout
the 1980s, and then jumped at the end of the decade, mainly due to increased
movements from Eastern Europe. However, entries of workers and of family
members of previous migrants also rose sharply in the late 1980s (SOPEMI, 1990)

2. Previous distinctions between types of migrations are
becoming increasingly meaningless. This is undermining
state migration policies.
Migration policies (where they existed at all!) have been premised on the belief
that fairly neat distinctions could be drawn between types of migration, such as:
Economic migration, which in turn is sub-divided into
—

unskilled

—

skilled

—

entrepreneurs, etc.

—

family re-union

—

refugees

Another distinction regarded as highly significant has been between temporary
migrants (usually workers) and permanent settlers.

Such distinctions have been central to a variety of official systems, including the
Australian immigration categories, the US Preference System, the German
'guestworker' program and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) framework.

Today, such distinctions are collapsing. Migratory chains, once established,
continue, even when the original policies on which they were based are changed or
reversed. For example, when the German Federal Government decided in 1973 to
stop labour migration and to encourage return migration, the main migratory
chain—that from Turkey—continued to develop, initially in the form of family re
union, then through refugee entries (Blaschke, 1990). Similarly, what appears as
entrepreneurial migration, may in fact be essentially a form of permanent family
movement, as in the case of some South-East Asian migration to Australia, Canada
and the USA.
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The classic case for the erosion of neat categories is that of refugees and asylum
seekers. The overwhelming majority of these do not fall under the criteria of
individual persecution of the UN Convention definition, even though they are
forced to leave their countries by war, famine, economic pressure, ethnic persecution
or ecological catastrophe (Ministry of Labour, Sweden, 1990). For the year 1990, the
UNHCR estimated the re-settlement needs for refugees at just 150,000, and called
on governments to be less generous to asylum-seekers who did not meet UNHCR
criteria, because giving them support might divert efforts from 'real' refugees
(UNHCR, 1989: 2). The huge gap between the UNHCR figure, and the world's 15
million refugees and asylum-seekers casts doubt on the viability of the Convention
definition, and points to the pressing need for new international policies on refugees
and asylum-seekers.

The overall effect of this situation is a general break-down in regulation of
migration and settlement by governments or supra-national bodies. As the OECD
has pointed out, policies to contain migratory flows are becoming 'difficult to
implement' and there is a growth in illegal movements to Europe as well as to other
regions (SOPEMI, 1990). Certainly there are no comprehensive joint European
policies on migration and refugees. However, where there are moves towards such
policies—such as through the Shengen and Trevi agreements—the emphasis is on
restriction and exclusion rather than on rational and humane immigration policies,
or on providing more effective support to refugees.

3. The growing disparities between economic, social and
demographic conditions in South and North (and East and
West) provide the context for future mass migrations.
In the 1990s, 90-100 million people will be added to world population every year.
By 2025, world population is expected to almost double to 8.5 billion people. While
the industrialised regions are projected to grow relatively little from 1.2 billion
people in 1990 to 1.35 billion in 2025, the LDCs will increase from 4 billion to 7.15
billion (IOM, 1990). This will lead to a vast increase in demand for jobs: the total
labour force of the LDCs is projected to grow by 733 million between 1990 and 2010.
For comparison, this is more than the total current labour force of the industrialised
countries—586 million in 1990. The LDCs need to create 36 million new jobs each
year in the 1990s—a target which seems quite unattainable in the light of the
performance of the last few decades (Golini et al., 1990).
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Population growth in LDCs is linked with rural-urban migration and rapid
urbanisation. In 1970, there were only 20 cities in the world with more than 5
million inhabitants. By 2000, there are expected to be 44—and most of them will be
in LDCs. The largest cities in the world are expected to be Mexico City and Sao
Paulo with 24 million people each. Other huge cities in LDCs will include Calcutta
(16 million), Bombay (15 million), Teheran (14 million) and Jakarta (13 million).
Poor housing, lack of social infrastructure and high unemployment are likely to
make these cities unattractive places in which to live.

It seems obvious that these demographic and social factors will create enormous
pressures for South-North migration (Zolberg, 1989). In terms of the simple pushpull models which were used to explain migrations in the 1960s, one could argue the
pull factors were the main explanatory factor during the mass labour migrations to
Western Europe from 1945 to about 1973: migrant workers came either because they
were recruited or because they had a justified expectation that they would find a
job (Castles and Kosack, 1973: 25-28). During recessions, labour migration declined.
In the 1980s, this changed: the push factors became dominant and people came
mainly because the conditions of life were completely intolerable in the area of
origin. Even unemployment and a marginal existence in the North became
preferable to staying in the South. In other words, such movements will continue
whatever the labour market situation and the policies of governments in the
North.

However, push-pull theories— generally based on simplistic human capital
theories—have only a very limited explanatory value. It is necessary to look
beyond individual movements and their immediate causes, if we wish to
understand the fundamental processes.
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4. Economic, social and demographic disparities alone do
not cause migration. Rather, the movements are an
expression of the interdependence between sending and
receiving areas within the political economy of the world
market. Moreover once movements start, they often lead to
chains of migration, which continue even when the initial
causes or government policies have changed.
It has long been obvious that it is usually not people from the very poorest countries,
nor the most impoverished people within a given area who are most likely to
migrate. Migration requires resources, both financial and of cultural capital. People
do not simply decide as individuals to move to another country to maximise their
life chances. Most migration is based on existing economic and social links,
connected with colonialism, international trade and investment, or previous
migratory movements. For example the US Bracero Program of the 1940s started a
long-term migratory movement from Mexico to the USA, just as the German
'guestworker' program led to a permanent chain of Turkish migration. Research by
Sassen (1988) has shown the strong links between investment, trade and migration;
increasing mobility of capital in the contemporary world economy is a principal
determinant of labour mobility. International migration is thus a collective
phenomenon which arises as part of a social relationship between the lessdeveloped and more-developed parts of a single global economic system (Portes and
Borocz, 1989).

Realisation of these links have an important consequence. Many people believe
that economic development of the countries of the South will reduce emigration.
The left has long called for 'development aid instead of migration', while the neo
liberal slogan has been 'trade in place of migration'. Today we must understand
that economic development, at least in the short and medium term will lead to
increased emigration from the poorer countries (see Tapinos, 1990). This is because
the development process—i.e. bringing less-developed areas into the world
economy—leads to such severe disruption of existing societal structures that
previous ways of living become unviable, and migration appears as the only
solution. In very general terms, the process has the following stages:
—

interaction with developed countries through colonialism, trade, aid and
foreign investment;

—

rural development (the 'Green Revolution');

—

rural-urban migration;
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—

emergence of large cities with poor social conditions and lack of
employment opportunities;

—

improved education but insufficient jobs for graduates, leading to the
'brain drain';

—

cultural influence of the rich countries through mass media, tourism,
commodification of cultural products;

—

better transport and communications;

—

temporary labour migrations;

—

permanent movements to richer countries;

—

establishment of links between migrant communities in rich countries and
areas of origin, strengthening the cultural influence of rich countries, and
sustaining migratory chains.

A good example for the way this process has worked for a successful NIC is Korea,
where the rapid industrialisation which has made the country one of Asia's 'four
tigers' has been accompanied by large-scale migration, mainly to the USA (Sassen,
1988: Chapter 4). However, this relationship between industrialisation and
emigration should hardly surprise us, when we remember that Britain's industrial
revolution in the 18th and 19th centuries was marked by mass overseas emigration
of proletarianised farmers and artisans.

Thus the current upsurge in South-North migration is essentially a reflection of the
economic, social and cultural crisis in many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin
America, caused by the post-colonial mode of incorporation into the world
capitalist economy. The end of the Cold War adds a new political dimension: as
long as there was a Second World which provided an alternative development
model, the concept of the Third World had a political significance as a possible
non-capitalist way to modernisation. The rise of OPEC and the NICs had already
eroded the economic usefulness of the concept of the Third World. Now the
political value has been lost too: there is no other way but the capitalist one. Since
millions of people have already experienced the dislocation, destitution and
injustice brought about by capitalist development, they are left with no hope of
realisation of human dignity and rights in their own countries. Migration to the
North now appears as the only way out.

At the same time—and this is stating the obvious—the end of the Soviet Empire
means an enormous additional potential for migration to the rich countries of
Western Europe and North America. Just as with the South, the economic and
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cultural incorporation of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union into the
capitalist world order is likely to give rise to large-scale migratory chains. In both
economic and cultural terms, East-West migration is likely to compete with SouthNorth movements, making the situation even more complex.

5.
The new types of migration correspond with the
restructuring of the economies and labour markets of the
developed countries in the last twenty years.
The ending of organised recruitment of manual workers by industrialised countries
in the early 1970s was not a mere conjunctural phenomenon, but rather a reaction to a
fundamental re-structuring of the labour process. The last two decades have been
marked by:
—

the 'new international division of labour', i.e. increased capital export
from developed countries and establishment of manufacturing industries
in the South;

—

the micro-electronic revolution;

—

erosion of traditional skilled manual occupations;

—

growth in the services sector, with demand for both highly-skilled and
low-skilled workers;

—

emergence of informal sectors in developed countries;

—

casualisation of employment, growth in part-time work, increasingly
insecure conditions of employment;

—

increased differentiation of labour forces on the basis of gender, age and
ethnicity (i.e. mechanisms which pushed many women, young people and
members of minorities into casual or informal-sector work);

—

a high degree of international mobility of highly-skilled workers.

Taking these tendencies together, we can speak of a new polarisation of the labour
forces of highly developed countries: the old blue-collar skilled working class has
shrunk, while both the highly-skilled workforce and the unskilled, casualised
workforce have grown. Social inequality and insecurity has been exacerbated by
the simultaneous decline of the welfare state. The labour movement has lost much
of its power and its innovative capacity, in line with the erosion of its former social
basis.
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Existing ethnic minorities and new migrants have played varying parts in these
developments. An exhaustive analysis is not possible, but here are a few examples.
Labour market policies which give preference to nationals have contributed to very
high unemployment rates for former 'guestworkers' and helped cushion the effects
of re-structuring for local workers. The highly-exploited work of migrant women in
the clothing industry has partly counteracted the trend to export of this type of
workplace to LDCs (Phizacklea, 1990). The emergence of ethnic small business as a
strategy for coping with racism and unemployment has played an important part in
urban renewal and in economic change (Waldinger et al., 1990; Tait et al., 1992;
Light and Bonacich, 1988; Blaschke, 1990). Temporary (and often illegal) foreign
workers from Poland play a significant role in the German building industry, while
undocumented African workers pick the fruit and vegetables of most Southern
European countries. In the NICs, the labour of women rural-urban migrants is central
to the development of the electronics industry, while attempts at industrialisation
in OPEC countries have been largely based on migrant labour, both highly-skilled
and manual. Clearly a new and highly complex political economy of migrant and
ethnic minority labour is emerging.

6.
Current developments in migration increase the
interdependence between immigration policies and policies
concerning the rights of established immigrant populations.
From 1945 until the early 1970s, the various types of migration to Western Europe
appeared as successive historical phases. However, by the 1980s this succession
was breaking down due to the overlap of these phases with various stages of the
migratory process. This increased the difficulty of formulating and implementing
coherent policies on immigration and ethnic minorities. This point sounds
somewhat obscure and technical, but once elucidated its significance becomes clear.

I have argued elsewhere (Castles et a l, 1984: Chapter 2; Castles, 1986) that the
principle post-1945 movements to Western Europe were characterised by a threestage migratory process:
—

first, migration of workers;

—

secondly, family re-union;

—

thirdly, permanent settlement and the formation of ethnic minorities.
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The historical phases were:
a) the immediate post-war migrations: movements of refugees and displaced
persons, overseas emigration of Europeans;
b) either at the same time or somewhat later, movements connected with
decolonisation, i.e. the return migration of white settlers to Britain, France,
Belgium and the Netherlands;
c) the labour migrations of the boom period (about 1950-73), whether of workers
from former colonies or of 'guestworkers' from the European periphery, which
affected most Western European countries1’
d) the period of economic restructuring from about 1973 to the mid-1980s, marked by
relative absence of labour migration, some return migration and the virtual
completion of family re-union for certain ethnic groups;
e) The period which started in the mid-1980s, in which there are new migrations of
a variety of types simultaneously, as already described.

For the purposes of the present discussion we can ignore phases a) and b) because
they did not lead to the formation of ethnic minorities in Western Europe. It is
evident that there was a high degree of correspondence between phases c) and d)
and the three stages of the migratory process. In policy terms this meant that the
significant discourse in phase c) concerned the recruitment and/or the control of
migrant labour. Phase d) was the period of consolidation of immigrant communities.
In this period, policies tended to become split into two areas: migration policy,
which was concerned with keeping out or repatriating workers and with regulating
and limiting family re-union, and policy towards established immigrants, which
was concerned with social and educational measures, and—increasingly as time
went on—with community relations and civil, social and political rights (see
Hammar, 1985). The lull in immigration and the relative stabilisation of
immigrant populations (albeit under conditions of inequality and social
disadvantage) seemed to offer the perspective of improvement. No new
immigrations would be permitted, but a gradual integration would be offered to
existing minorities.

Now, this general interpretation of the situation has its problems: certainly there
were national variations and countervailing tendencies. State responses were
inconsistent and changed according to the ideology of the party in power. Moreover,
1

The timing varies somewhat for different countries. The difference is greatest for Britain
where most labour migration was stopped in 1962 and family re-union took place mainly
up to the early 1970s. A detailed discussion is not possible here.
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both informal and institutionalised racism were ever-present while racist
movements grew throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Nonetheless, it seems to me that
there was a perspective for a gradual amelioration of the situation of ethnic
minorities, and even for the emergence of multicultural and anti-racist policies in
some countries. The escalation and diversification of migratory movements of the
late 1980s and early 1990s has helped reverse such trends. The simultaneous
existence of the various forms of migration and the different stages of the migratory
process has thrown state policies into confusion. The division between migration
policy and policy towards established immigrant groups simply does not work any
more, and hampers effective measures, leading to a threatening political vacuum.

7. State policies towards migrants and minorities have
tended to become increasingly complex and contradictory,
as governments have sought to address a variety of
seemingly irreconcilable goals; such as:
—

provision of labour supplies

—

differentiation and control of migrant workers

—

immigration control and repatriation

—

management of urban problems

—

reduction of welfare expenditure

—

maintenance of public order

—

integration of minorities into social and political institutions

—

construction of national identity and maintenance of the nation state.

As the migratory process has matured and new migrations have developed, policies
have had to address an increasing number of areas, and to deal with ever-more
complex situations. State responses have almost invariably been piecemeal and ad
hoc, without any long-term, coherent strategies. This applies particularly where
governments, for political reasons, have been unwilling to admit the reality of
long-term settlement and continued immigration (e.g. in Germany, which according
to the main political parties is still 'not a country of immigration'). To some extent
the above list of gaols is chronological: the emphasis was on labour supply and
control of migrant workers in the 1950s and 1960s; on migration control and
repatriation in the 1970s; on management of the urban crisis and on cutting welfare
in the 1970s and early 1980s; and on public order, the long-term position of
minorities and—again—on immigration control in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
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The overlap of these policy goals obviously leads to major contradictions, here are
a few examples:
—

exclusionary policies which deny rights and citizenship prevent
integration into political institutions and exacerbate public order
problems;

—

immigration control and repatriation threaten the situation of existing
ethnic minorities by criminalising later segments of migratory chains;

—

policies which lead to employment of undocumented workers provide
cheap labour for certain economic sectors, but also undermine general
labour market polices, split the labour force and help cause racism;1

—

crisis management strategies based on blaming the 'enemy within'
contribute to racist violence and threaten public order;

—

attempts to stabilise national identity through the strengthening and
naturalisation of ethnic boundaries lead to increased racism and push
minorities into separatism and even fundamentalism.

To make the situation even more complicated, it became increasingly difficult to
specify what the state is in European countries, both because of the unclear division
of responsibilities in the migration area between national and supranational
authorities, and because of still contested and unfinished re-ordering of the
division between public and private in social policies. What state is responsible for
migration policies: the individual states of European countries, the European
Community as an embryonic all-European state, or even the superstate of the
North, responsible for imposing the 'new world order' on the South? Balibar (1991:
17) concludes that there is no 'law-governed state' in Europe and that this leads to
a 'collective sense of identity panic'. This contributes to the psychological
insecurity which helps to cause informal racism, as well as providing the political
space for populist racist movements.

1

Or, as Balibar puts it, T h e modern state ...opens the door to 'clandestine' circulation of
the foreign labour force, and at the same time represses it' (Balibar, 1991:16).
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8. Racism in European societies has two sets of causes. The
first concerns ideologies and practices going hack to
colonialism and the construction of nation states in Europe.
The second set of causes derives from current processes of
socialeconomic and political change. The increased
salience of racism and the shift in its targets over the last
twenty years reflects the rapid pace of change in living and
working conditions, the dissolution of the cultural forms
and organisational structures of the working class, and the
weakness and ambivalence of the state.
As many authors have pointed out (for instance Miles, 1989; Rex and Tomlinson,
1979; CCCS, 1982; Gilroy, 1987), racism has been a significant factor in European
societies for centuries. Its roots are manifold: they lie in the ideologies of white
superiority which underpinned colonialism, in processes of ethnic exclusion as part
of the development of nation-states, in chauvinist nationalist ideologies linked to
intra-European conflict, and in attitudes and practices towards immigrant
minorities. An adequate discussion is neither necessary nor possible here. For our
purposes it is important to realise that Western European countries have longestablished cultures of racism, which lead to a predisposition to 'racialist'
immigrants and ethnic minorities, i.e. to categorise alleged differences between
them and the majority group in either biological or in cultural terms, which are
seen as 'natural' and hence immutable.

This predisposition may be seen as constant, but it is clear that racism as an
empirical reality changes over time, with regard to its targets, its forms of
expression and its intensity. For practical politics, it is crucial to understand and
explain these variations. There is considerable evidence of increasing intensity of
racism of all kinds—institutional practices, vilification, discrim ination,
harassment, violence—in most Western European countries since the early 1970s
(Castles et ah, 1984: Chapter 7). The recent outbreaks of racist violence in Germany,
the strength of the extreme right in France and the emergence of new racisms in
Southern Europe all point to a new strength of racist ideologies. Racism appears to
be taking on a new character which is threatening not only to ethnic minorities, but
to liberal democratic political forms in general.
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The historical background to this are developments such as:
—

the end of European colonialism;

—

the decline of older industrial areas, the end of full employment (both as
a reality and a policy aim), the erosion of the welfare state;

—

the social and urban crisis in many parts of Western Europe;

—

the economic ascendancy of some former colonies or semi-colonies,
particularly in East and South-East Asia and oil-producing countries;

—

mass migration and establishment of new ethnic minorities in European
cities.

In the early 1970s, it could be argued that racism had the same character towards
immigrants workers in all the labour-importing countries in Western Europe, and
did not depend primarily on phenotypical factors (skin colour) or origins (nonEuropean as opposed to European periphery). For example there were strong
similarities in attitudes and behaviour towards Italian workers in Switzerland
and black workers in Britain (Castles and Kosack, 1973). By the late 1980s, this
was no longer the case: there appeared to be a much higher degree of social
acceptance of intra-European migrants, which contrasted with strongly
exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants from the South and minorities who were
visibly different (through skin colour or other phenotypical differences). This
change can be attributed to a number of factors: the end of migration from the
European periphery; the absorption of some former European migrant groups into
citizenship or secure resident status; the decline of individual European
nationalisms due to European integration; and the tentative and gradual emergence
of a 'European consciousness'.

The danger is that this 'European consciousness' will be constructed in exclusionary
and discriminatory terms towards the perceived threat of being swamped by the
'desperate masses' from the South. Indeed, it is possible that it might be
constructed as a much narrower Western European nationalism, in view of fears of
mass East-West migration. An example for the ambivalence of the situation was
the reaction of Italians to the so-called 'Albanian invasion' of August 1989. On the
one hand, there were calls for admitting the several thousand spontaneous
migrants, on the grounds that 'after all they are Europeans too' and desperately in
need of help. On the other hand, it was pointed out that letting in one group would
encourage further waves, and, furthermore that it would be hard to justify
excluding equally desperate people from Africa, except on openly racist grounds. In
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the end, the reaction of the Italian state was uncharacteristically draconian and
repressive: mass expulsion using military means.

At the moment, a further differentiation is emerging: Muslim immigrant groups are
becoming the main targets of racist discourses. This is partly because Muslims form
the largest non-European minorities in France and Germany, and amongst the
largest in other countries. There is also a connection with historical conflicts
between Christian and Muslim peoples in the Mediterranean region. A further link
is with international affairs: in the early 1970s, the recession was blamed on the
'oil sheiks', while the Islamic Revolution in Iran and more recently the Gulf War
have led to fears of a challenge to the dominance of the major industrial powers.
Public debates on the 'population explosion' of the Maghreb increase the perception
of an imminent invasion. Thus Muslim minorities appear threatening partly
because they are linked to strong external forces, which appear to threaten the
hegemony of the North, and partly because they have a visible and self-confident
cultural presence. The Rushdie Affair took on major significance precisely because it
linked all these factors. At the same time, such discourses present an ideological
opportunity to the extreme right: by playing on such fears and linking them to
European historical traditions, it can take on a new pan-European character, and
break out of its old ultra-nationalist ghetto.

To sum up, it may be said that the current increase in racism, and the changes in its
form and character, are closely linked to the processes of rapid economic, social and
political change affecting the population of Western European countries in the last
two decades. The main impact of the changes has been on the blue-collar urban
working class which has seen its economic basis and social situation severely
eroded. Immigrants and new minorities have become the visible symbol of this
erosion and hence the target for resentment. Thus as Balibar (1988A: 289-302) points
out, racism is not so much a result of the crisis as one form of its expression. Racism
should not be analysed as a working-class phenomenon, but rather as one product of
the dissolution of working-class culture and political organisation. As popular
cultures have been pushed aside by mass, international, commodifying cultural
industries, the power to deal with change and to absorb new influences has been
lost. As the membership of unions and working-class parties has declined, the
ideological and organisational basis for an effective response to the attack on
living standards has been lost (Wievorka, 1991). Thus Balibar (1988B: 272-88)
argues that the issue is not that of 'racism of the working class', but rather of 'the
dissolution of parts of the working class into a racist mass'.
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9. The constitution of new minorities, with distinct cultures,
identities and institutions, is an irreversible process, which
questions existing notions of national identity and
citizenship.
The transformation of immigrant populations into new ethnic minorities1 was not
inevitable. It would theoretically have been possible for immigrants in Western
European countries to maintain their own languages and cultures, both individually
and through associations, without any stigmatising consequences. It is only when
they experience discrimination, and when processes of cultural maintenance are met
with exclusionary institutional practices and informal racism, that immigrants in
turn define their group boundaries in cultural terms. Ethnic minority cultures—even
when they take on traditionalist forms—have the task of self-protection (in both
material and psychological terms) against a hostile environment.

Today, the reversal of racist and exclusionary policies would no longer be sufficient
to bring about the cultural and political integration of minorities, in the sense of
eliminating the need for some degree of organisational and cultural autonomy.2 The
point is that ethnic minorities are now firmly established, both culturally and
organisationally, so that Western European countries have no choice but to accept
some form of cultural pluralism for the foreseeable future. Policies based on
political and cultural assimilation (the French model) or on exclusionary
definitions of nationality (the German model) (see Brubaker, 1990) can no longer
serve as effective forms of integration of the nation-state. The de facto ethnic
diversity and pluralism of most Western European countries requires new
approaches.

1

Defined for the purposes of the present paper as: social groups whose boundaries are
drawn by dominant social groups according to perceived phenotypical or cultural
characteristics, and which have specific economic, social an d /o r legal situations imposed
upon them.

2

Anyway, it is questionable whether this could ever happen in the first few generations of a
migratory process even under the best possible conditions. It is also questionable
whether such cultural homogenisation is desirable. These are are issues which will not be
pursued here.
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10. The Western European countries of immigration are
being forced to examine the relationship between ethnic
diversity, national identity and citizenship. Multicultural
models of membership of civil society and the nation-state
appear to offer their best solution, but there are substantial
obstacles to their realisation.
The varying ways in which the 'imagined community' of the nation-state has been
constructed in Western European countries in the past are losing their viability. The
presence of new ethnic minorities is only one facet of the challenge. Others include:
—

European integration and the emergence of a European consciousness. On
the positive side this means overcoming the old chauvinisms linked to
past wars; on the negative side it means erecting boundaries towards the
rest of the world: the 'Fortress Europa' model.1

—

the development of a commodified global culture, borne by transnational
capital and the mass media, which challenges national cultures.

—

emergence of regional movements, often based on the re-discovered ethnic
cultures of historical minorities within nation states.

—

the emergence of a right-wing, populist nationalism as a reaction to the
failure of modernity to keep its promise of material prosperity for
substantial sections of the population.

It seems to me that the only viable solution lies in an approach to identity and
citizenship based on the multicultural models which have emerged in Australia
and Canada. These are countries which have consciously used immigration as part
of the process of nation-building, and have in the long-run been forced to revise
their concepts of national identity and their institutional structures to take account
of the cultural diversity of their populations. These models are not without their
problems (see Castles et al., 1990) but they have been fairly successful in managing
ethnic diversity and maintaining good community relations. The Western European
countries did not aim to change their demographic and cultural composition
through immigration, but that has in fact happened, and the current debate on

1

An interesting expression of this is the term 'extracomunitario1now widely used as a label
for immigrants from outside the European Community in Italy. The term has become as
perjorative as Arabe in France or Auslander in Germany. It is a way of homogenising
difference in exclusionary terms, whereby the core of difference is non-belonging to a
(new) imagined European community.
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national identity and citizenship must take account of this reality, by moving
away from monocultural myths.

Certainly there is a debate on multicultural models in Europe. Sweden has gone
some way to applying them, though with considerable difficulties (Alund and
Schierup, 1991). It is important to look both at the general principles necessary to
apply multiculturalism in Western Europe, and at specific issues like the social and
political rights of permanent settlers, naturalisation polices, citizenship of the
second generation and minority cultural rights. The main issue, however, is still
that of the political will to move away from outmoded forms of nationalism and
the nation-state. Major obstacles to the introduction of multicultural policies
include:
—

the conflict between immigration policy, as a form of differential
exclusion from the territory and hence society, and citizenship as a way
of including people in civil society and the nation-state;

—

the gap between formal citizenship (as a system of civil and political
rights) and the de facto restriction of economic and social rights of
members of ethnic minorities, particularly due to economic restructuring
and the decline of the welfare state;

—

racism and nationalism.

11. In view of the multi-faceted links between the world
economy, migratory processes, minority formation and the
transformation of societies of immigration, research in this
area can no longer be mono disciplinary and national in
focus. There is a need for a multidisciplinary and
international social science of migration and multicultural
societies, combining elements of political economy,
sociology, political science, law, demography, anthropology
and related disciplines.
In the period of mass labour migration to industrialised countries, the focus of
academic research was mainly on the economics of migrant labour, and on the
sociology and social-psychology of 'immigrant-host relations'. Later, in response to
the apparent ending of labour migration and the permanent settlement of
immigrant groups, more critical approaches developed, which sited labour
migration in the political economy of capitalism, examined the sociology of
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minority formation and the racialisation of social relations, or looked at the
politics of crisis management. It is now clear that labour migration did not end, but
has merely changed its form. Indeed, migration and use of 'unfree labour' has
always been part of the capitalist system (Cohen, 1987). It is also clear that
minority formation and racialisation are central aspects of social relations at the
national and international levels.

What is new is that it has become apparent that all these processes of migration
and minority formation are taking place simultaneously and increasingly in many
parts of the world. The long-term result seems likely to be the emergence of
multicultural societies in many areas, leading in turn to new concepts of citizenship
and the nation-state. The consequence for critical social scientists working on
immigration, racism and ethnic relations should be a new awareness of the global
and all-pervading scope of the subject of research. Monodisciplinary studies of
particular facets are only justifiable within the context of an interdisciplinary
theoretical and analytical framework which provides understanding of the links
between the particular and the general, the local and the global. The study of
migration and multicultural societies should therefore be understood as a social
science in its own right, which is strongly multidisciplinary in its theoretical
approaches and methodology.

12. The increasing volume of migration and its changing
character, together with the emergence of ethnically
heterogeneous societies in Europe makes a re-examination
of political positions essential. Wie need to re-define the
meaning of 'international solidarity' with regard to
migration policies and the North-South divide, to examine
potential contradictions in anti-racist positions, and to work
out political agendas which can lead to democratic,
multicultural societies.
Migration has often been an issue of contention within the labour movement, due to
the potential threat to wages, conditions and organisational unity presented by
immigrant workers. Policies have ranged from international solidarity through to
racist exclusionism. Since 1945, the Western European left has generally taken an
internationalist and anti-racist line. In the current situation, it seems necessary to
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me to re-examine and re-define such positions. A number of dilemmas need to be
addressed.

Immigration control is by its nature selective, exclusionary and restrictive. Should
we therefore reject all control and demand 'open borders' (as has recently been
debated within the German Green Party)? In the present circumstances this could
lead to large and chaotic flows, resulting in conflict and racism, giving increased
impetus to the extreme right, and probably—in the long run—bringing about even
stricter control. On the other hand, there is a realisation by governments and
international agencies that immigration control, in its present form, is increasingly
ineffective (Purcell, 1990; Ministry of Labour, Sweden, 1990; SOPEMI, 1990).

South-North and East-West migration can present effective individual strategies
for survival and improvement in life chances, but it cannot provide general solutions
to global disparities. The number of people who could conceivably migrate to the
industrialised countries is only a drop in the ocean, compared with the number of
people facing severe economic and social problems in the LDCs. There is little
evidence that migration, under current arrangements, does anything to support
development in the areas of origin. Indeed individual movements can hamper
development, for example by withdrawing people with desperately needed skills.
In the past, the answer to this dilemma was found in the principle 'development in
place of migration'. As pointed out above, it is now clear that these are false
alternatives: development and industrialisation actually lead to increased
migration for a substantial period.

Finally, there seems to be a potential conflict between the ethnic minorities which
developed out of the labour migrations between 1950 and the early 1970s, and the
new immigrants. The former see the newcomers as a threat to the gains they are
beginning to make, and as a catalyst for increased racism. Again, the actual content
of solidarity needs to be discussed in this context.

There are no easy answers to any of these dilemmas. To find solutions it is necessary
to perceive migrations and the shift to multicultural societies as a central aspect of
contemporary global development. For the left in industrialised countries, that
would mean developing and advocating a coordinated strategy which
simultaneously addresses issues of migration, multiculturalism, foreign and trade
policy, and development policy.
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Migration
We do need a migration policy that balances international solidarity with the
social and economic conditions of receiving areas. That means that each Western
European country (and supra-national bodies such as the European Community and
the OECD) needs to accept that a certain amount of both permanent and temporary
migration will take place, and that it is better to plan and administer this, that to
drive it underground by trying in vain to stop it. I have in mind something like the
systems adopted in the USA, Canada and Australia, where regular decisions are
made on the numbers to be admitted in the categories of economic migrants, refugees
and family re-union. It is important to demand that all long-term migrants should
have the right to permanent residence and family re-union, although this does not
preclude some special temporary admission schemes for students and trainees as
part of development policies. A further demand is that entry criteria should be free
of discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, country of origin, religion, culture
or gender. This does not preclude discrimination on the basis of criteria like
education or training (in economic migration categories), and need (in refugee
categories).

The demand for a migration policy may seem paradoxical in view of previous
remarks in this paper on the breakdown of migration control and the erosion of
entry categories. Nobody should have the illusion that such a policy can be easily
and fully implemented. My argument is that it is better for countries to have
policies based on a reasonable amount of immigration, selected according to fair
criteria, even if these can only be partially effective, rather than to have
unrealistic and discriminatory policies which lead to chaotic, exploitative and
conflictual situations.

Multiculturalism
Demands for a fairer immigration system must be accompanied by a struggle for
improved rights for immigrants and their descendants once in Western European
countries. In the final analysis, this means working towards public policies of
multiculturalism. Citizenship for permanent settlers and their children is crucial.
Where immigrants do not want to give up their previous nationality, dual
citizenship, or latent citizenship of the country of origin are possible answers. An
alternative is some type of quasi-citizenship, that gives essential rights, including
the right to vote, but stops short of actual naturalisation. Multiculturalism also
implies the guarantee of minority cultural and linguistic rights. These include not
only the right to individual and collective expression, but also the provision of
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necessary services, such as translation and interpreting facilities, to guarantee
equal access to courts, social amenities, etc. Measures for children need to be two
fold: on the one hand support services to prevent disadvantage for children of
different linguistic and cultural background in the mainstream school, on the other
hand educational support for the maintenance of other languages and cultures. The
core of multiculturalism is the demand for full political, economic and social
participation of all members of society, whatever their ethnic background.
Multicultural policy therefore necessarily includes a range of measures to counter
discrimination, to ensure equal opportunities in all areas, and above all to combat
racism.

Foreign and Trade Policy
Measures to reduce the North-South divide, and, in the long term, to reduce the
need for migration, are as much issues of foreign and trade policy as of development
policy. Stopping arms exports to LDCs could be the biggest single step towards
cutting the number of asylum seekers. Trade policies which change the conditions
and terms of trade in the favour of the South could make a major contribution. A
drastic overhaul of the European Community's Common Agricultural Policy is an
example. New attitudes towards social development in the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank and similar agencies would also be important. An important
demand for the left in this context would be for a new emphasis on human rights in
all international and trade relations.

Development Policy
As pointed out, in the short to medium term, development in the countries of the
South will lead to increased emigration. Nonetheless, economic and social
development is the only long-term solution to current imbalances, and should
therefore be given priority. That means supporting development policies which
involve real transfer of resources from North to South. A further demand is to
include principles of ecologically sustainable development into all investment
projects. Measures to improve health and social security in LDCs are also
significant, in view of their long-term demographic consequences. Finally,
development and migration policies should be linked, for instance through training
schemes for migrants to provide the skills necessary for economic development upon
return, or by making investment resources available to returning migrants.
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Conclusion
Such proposals sound utopian, in view of the current priorities of the 'new world
order'. Even if they were introduced, they would not bring about quick solutions to
the increasing problems of migration and racism. Global migration is certain to go on
increasing for the foreseeable future, and it will take place under very difficult
conditions. Nonetheless, it is important to be able to put forward an alternative
long-term perspective, because it gives credibility to the more immediate demands:
those for fair and humane immigration policies, and for the recognition of the
rights of immigrants within multicultural societies.
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CHAPTER 4

ITALIANS IN AUSTRALIA
THE IMPACT OF A RECENT
MIGRATION ON THE CULTURE AND
SOCIETY OF A POST-COLONIAL
NATION

The aim of this paper is to describe Italian immigration and settlement in
Australia, and to show how the Italian presence is helping to shape Australian
society in a period of rapid change.1 Since British colonisation in 1788, Australia
has been a country of immigration. Apart from the 2 per cent of the population who
are Aborigines or Torres Strait Islanders, the whole population are immigrants or
descendants of immigrants. The largest waves of immigration were from about 1850
to 1890, and then from 1945 to the present. The first wave was mainly of people
from Britain, whose settlement provided the basis for the construction of AngloAustralia as part of the British Empire. The second wave has been much more
diverse, consisting not only of Britons but also of eastern and southern Europeans,
and then, increasingly, of Asians.

There was some Italian immigration before the Second World War, but most came
between 1950 and 1970. Italian community formation is thus much more recent than
in the Americas. Today, Italo-Australians are still the largest non-British group,
but they are declining in numbers, and may soon be overtaken by Asian groups. The
Italian presence coincides with two major changes. The first is the growth of ethnic
diversity and the resulting search for a new national identity, no longer based
simply on British heritage. The most obvious symbol of this is the emergence of
multiculturalism as an official policy. The second is the end of Empire and
Australia's hesitant re-orientation towards the Asian-Pacific region. The central
question is whether Italian influence on Australian culture and identity has helped

1

This paper is based on a book on Italians in Australia edited by Stephen Castles,
Caroline Alcorso, Gaetano Rando and Ellie Vasta, published in July 1992 in English and
Italian. The research for the book has been coordinated by the Centre for Multicultural
Studies at the University of Wollongong, and has been funded by the Fondazione
Giovanni Agnelli of Turin. The full citations are given in the References. In this paper
references will be given to the English edition.

maintain a eurocentric view of the world, or rather has helped prepare Australia
for a post-colonial and post-European future.

Italian Immigration and Settlement
The Colonial Period
The colonies in Australia were established to provide an outlet for Britain's surplus
population, pauperized and criminalized by the Industrial Revolution. Convicts
were soon joined by free settlers, with the state playing a major role in organizing
migration. British settlers drove the Aborigines from the land, and decimated
them through warfare, disease and removal of their means of subsistence
(Reynolds, 1987). Australia was established as a white settler society, based on
British culture and fully integrated into the political and economic structures of the
Empire. In the 19th century Australia became an important source of food and raw
materials for Britain, with the gold rushes of the 1850s providing a major stimulus
to development (Dyster and Meredith, 1990).

Australia, with its vast open spaces and relatively high wages, became a magnet
for migrants. The population grew from less than 1 million in 1850 to 3.8 million by
1901. The largest non-British settler group were the Irish, but there were also
Germans, Italians and other Europeans. Reactions were hostile when Chinese
workers arrived, first as cheap labour recruited by employers, then as gold miners.
Violent attacks by white miners were followed by exclusionary laws in several
colonies. South Pacific Islanders, recruited by Queensland plantation owners, met
similar reactions. One of the first laws passed by the Parliament, established
when the Australian colonies joined as a Federation in 1901, was the Immigration
Restriction Act. This was designed to keep out non-Europeans, and became known as
the White Australia Policy. It remained in force until the 1960s.

Italian migration started early, though numbers were small. There were a few
Italian convicts on the First Fleet in 1788. Some Italians came in the early 19th
century as travellers, missionaries or political emigres. The gold rushes brought
more, including 2,000 Swiss Italians from Ticino, who formed the first Italian
community at Daylesford in Victoria. Some were radicals, like Raffaelo Carboni, a
leader and chronicler of the Eureka Stockade goldminers' rebellion of 1854, which
played a major role in the development of democracy in Victoria. Most Italian
immigrants were itinerant male workers, who roamed the colonies in search of jobs
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in agriculture, mines, construction or transport. Most returned to Italy, though some
settled, often marrying Irish-Australian women. Pascoe (1992: 87-89) sees these
'scouts' as the first stage in the formation of Italo-Australian communities: they
did not settle in groups themselves, but started 'a buzz of gossip about economic
opportunities throughout Australia', which was to form the basis of later chain
migration.

The 1891 census recorded 3,890 Italians in Australia, of whom only one sixth were
women. In this year North Queensland employers began recruiting Italian workers
to replace South Pacific Islanders on the sugar-cane plantations. Italian migration
grew further in the 1920s, as restrictive immigration laws in the USA closed off
that destination. It is in this period that Italo-Australian communities begin to
emerge. Some of the sugar-cane workers of North Queensland pooled their resources
to purchase their own farms and settled permanently. Other Italians established
fishing industries in Western Australia, South Australia and New South Wales.
Cooperation between family members and paesani (fellow-villagers) made it
possible to purchase boats and equipment, and gave an advantage over the more
individualistic Anglo-Australians. Fruit and vegetable farming were further
activities which made use of the Italians' pre-migration experience. Those who
settled in towns often started small shops, cafes or restaurants. Successful
immigrants brought in wives, relatives and friends. Soon distinctly Italian areas
began to emerge in country and town. Social and cultural institutions made their
appearance, including the Catholic Church, the festa (or street festival) and
associations of various kinds (Pascoe, 1992: 89-90). The first Italian regional club
was the Circolo Isole Eolie, founded in Sydney in 1903.

By 1939, Italo-Australians had a visible presence in many areas, although their
numbers were still small. The Italian population grew from 8,135 in 1921 to 26,756 in
1933. In the latter year they were still only 0.4 per cent of Australia's total
population of 6.6 million, but they were concentrated in certain areas and
occupations, and appeared threatening to some people. Many Anglo-Australians
were hostile towards Italians. Commissions of inquiry were set up to investigate
the effect of Italian immigration on wages. Laws were passed to limit the types of
jobs non-British migrants could take, and restricting land ownership. There were
'anti-dago' riots in the Western Australian mining town of Kalgoorlie in 1919 and
again in 1934. With the onset of war in 1939, Italians were classified as 'enemy
aliens', even if they had become British citizens.1 They were treated with
1

There was no independent Australian citizenship until 1949.
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suspicion and subjected to surveillance by the security forces. About 10 per cent of
Australia's Italian population (4,727 people) were imprisoned in internment camps
(Alcorso and Alcorso, 1992; Cresciani, 1988).

The Postwar Immigration Program
After 1945, Australia embarked on a mass immigration program which was to
change not only the country's demographic and economic structures, but also its
ethnic composition and national identity. The Japanese victories in the Pacific in
1941-42 had convinced Australia's leaders that the country could no longer rely on
Britain for its security, and that a larger population and a strong economy with a
modern manufacturing sector were essential. The first Minister of Immigration,
Arthur Calwell, used the slogan of 'populate or perish' to help overcome workingclass suspicion of immigration, telling the public that 'we must fill the country or
lose it' (Collins, 1988: 21).

The aim was to attract migrants from Britain, but not enough wanted to come, and
the Department of Immigration began recruiting elsewhere. Australia developed a
system of preference for 'desirable types' of immigrants: the British were at the
top, followed by northern Europeans, eastern Europeans and finally southern
Europeans. Non-Europeans—particularly Asians—were to be completely excluded.
There was great resistance to recruitment of southern Europeans, and only limited
quotas were admitted in the late 1940s. Nonetheless, southern Europe became the
main source of migrants in the 1950s, and Italy the largest single country of origin
after Britain.

Spontaneous movements from Italy started in 1945, and 33,000 Italians came by
1950. In March 1951 a bilateral accord between Italy and Australia came into effect:
20,000 migrants per year were to be admitted for 5 years. They were to be provided
with financial assistance by both governments, and with loans from Italian
charitable organisations. Medical checks were to ensure that only healthy men
were selected, while criminals, communists and fascists were to be excluded. Initial
accommodation was to be provided in camps and hostels. However, 1952 was a year
of recession in Australia, and many of the newly-arrived Italians found themselves
unemployed and penniless in isolated camps, like Bonegilla in northern Victoria.
They started to complain about the food, the hostility of the local population, and
the failure to provide employment. The Australian authorities feared unrest and
communist agitation. Matters came to a head with riots at Bonegilla, and
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demonstrations by unemployed Italian workers in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane
(Bosworth, 1988: 614).

As economic conditions improved in 1954, Italian immigration increased. New
entrants were directed into jobs unwanted by Australians, in infrastructure projects
like the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Scheme, in heavy industry such as the
steelworks of Newcastle and Wollongong, or in the new engineering and textile
factories of Sydney and Melbourne. Others were sent to Queensland to cut sugar
cane. Once migration got under way, most Italians came on their own initiative.
Assisted migration accounted for only 20 per cent of total migration from Italy.
Family reunion soon gathered momentum, since all permanent immigrants had the
right to bring in their spouse and children, and to sponsor other relatives.
TABLE 1: ITALIAN MIGRATION TO AUSTRALIA 1947-76
1947-51

1951-61

1961-71

Total Net Migration
33,280
Annual Average__________8,320

179,420
17,942

72,333
7,233

1971-76

Total 47-76

- 4,463
280,570
-892________ 9,675

Note: Figures are for financial years from 1 July to 30 June. Net migration is the number of
arrivals minus the number of departures. A negative figure means that more people
departed than entered.
Source: Calculations from Table 2.2 of Price, 1979.

As Table 1 shows, the 1950s and 1960s were the main period of migration from Italy
to Australia. Over 360,000 Italians came between 1947 and 1976, but about 90,000
departed, making a net migration of about 270,000. During the period 1951-60, 6.5
per cent of total emigration from Italy was directed to Australia, with an average
of 17,000 entrants per year. After 1961 the proportion began to decrease as migration
to western European countries, or from the South to the North of Italy, became more
attractive. Only 4.5 per cent of Italian emigrants went to Australia from 1961-70
(Bosworth, 1988: 616). By the early 1970s, as a result of recession in Australia and
growing prosperity in Italy, more Italian-born people were leaving Australia than
entering.

The Italian born population of Australia increased from 120,000 in 1954 to 290,000 in
1971. Then it started declining, reaching 264,000 in 1990. However the ItaloAustralian community continued to grow, as children were born to Italian settlers.
Italians were the largest immigrant group after the British, making up over 12 per
cent of the overseas-born population in the 1960s. Table 2 gives the figures at
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various censuses. Italian-born people made up 2.3 per cent of the total population of
Australia in 1966, a figure which fell to 1.7 per cent by 1986.

Most migrants came from Calabria, Sicily, Abruzzi and Campania, although there
were some from the North, particularly the Veneto and Friuli Venezia Giulia. The
majority were from rural areas, yet they soon concentrated in Australia's growing
industrial cities. Most migrants were aged between 20 and 40 when they left Italy.
They were usually impoverished, and came in order to obtain the means for family
survival, or to earn the money needed to buy land or pay debts at home. Often their
education was limited to primary school level, and most had not received any
vocational training beyond the most basic level. Although there have always been
some better-educated migrants, the failure to recognize their qualifications in
Australia has often made it hard for them to pursue their professions: many skilled
workers and professionals have been forced into unskilled manual work.
TABLE 2: ITALIAN-BORN PERSONS IN AUSTRALIA
Census Year

Italian-Born
Population

Per cent of Overseas
Bom Population

Per cent of Total
Population

1881
1891
1901
1911
1921
1933
1947
1954
1961
1966
1971
1976
1981
1986

1,880
3,890
5,678
6,798
8,135
26,756
33,632
119,897
228,296
267,325
289,476
280,154
275,883
262,435

n.a.
n.a.
0.7
n.a.
0.9
3.0
4.5
9.3
12.8
12.5
11.2
10.3
9.2
8.1

0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.4
1.3
2.2
2.3
2.3
2.1
1.9
1.7

Sources: Australian censuses as reported by Borrie, 1954; Price, 1979; Price and Martin, 1975;
Jupp, 1988; DIEA, 1983. Note— n.a. = not available.

Most Italians migrated not as individuals, but as participants in migratory chains:
the first migrant from a certain Italian village, usually male, established a
bridgehead, finding somewhere to live and a livelihood. Then he was joined by his
wife, children, relatives and paesani. This pattern was unintentionally reinforced
by Australian immigration policy: under sponsorship arrangements, Italians
already in the country could help their relatives get visas by undertaking to
provide accommodation and work for them on arrival (Burnley, 1988: 626). Thus
colonies were established—a whole group would move from a village in Italy to a
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certain area of an industrial town or a farming district in Australia. This made it
possible to keep links with the community of origin, and to maintain specific
dialects and cultural practices in Australia.

Patterns of Settlement
Italian settlement is closely interwoven with the evolution of Australia's economic
and regional structure. Before 1945, the greatest concentration of Italians (one
third) were in Queensland, and most of them worked on the land. The introduction
of cane-cutting machines in the 1960s drastically cut the need for rural labour
(Menghetti, 1988). Today, less than 7 per cent of the Italian-born live in
Queensland, and many of these are in Brisbane. Similarly, in Western Australia
many Italians settled initially in the gold mining areas in the 1920s and in the
agricultural areas in the 1940s and 1950s. By the 1960s they were moving into the
Perth metropolitan area, where the great majority live today (Stransky, 1988:
605).

Before 1945 about 40 per cent of Italians in Victoria lived in country areas such as
Shepparton, Wangaratta, Myrtleford, Mildura and Swan Hill. Italians in
Melbourne were mainly in central areas, like Carlton, where many were
shopkeepers. After 1945, the rapid expansion of manufacturing in Melbourne
attracted most of the new immigrants. By 1981, almost 90 per cent of Italians in
Victoria lived in Melbourne. Initially most lived in central areas: Sicilians in
Brunswick, Pugliesi in Fitzroy and Viggianesi in Carlton. Within a few years,
many moved out, mainly to the Northern suburbs, in search of better housing
(Bertelli, 1988: 630-31).

Italian chain migration to Sydney started in the 1920s. By 1933 there were 400
Italians in the inner-city area of Leichhardt (Burnley, 1988: 627), as well as groups
of fishermen in Balmain and market-gardeners on the western outskirts. The
settlers in Leichhardt came mainly from the Lippari Islands, Sicily, Vicenza and
Udine (Ware, 1988: 618), while the market-gardeners were mainly Calabrians.
Postwar migratory chains strengthened these communities, for instance Leichhardt
had 6,000 Italian-born residents by 1961 (Burnley, 1988: 627). Italian settlement
also increased in the west and south of Sydney, with employment shifting from the
primary sector to manufacturing, construction and transport. Many market gardens
became residential areas, as land values increased. Calabrians and Sicilians (some
of whom had moved from North Queensland) settled in Fairfield in the west of
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Sydney, making it the largest single Italian community in NSW (10,747 Italian
speakers in 1986).

Italo-Australians Today: a Statistical Overview
The Australian population more than doubled from 7.5 million in 1945 to 17.3
million in 1990. Table 3 shows that the overseas-born population grew far more
rapidly than the total population between 1947 and 1971. By 1971, immigrants
made up one in five of the total population, a share which remained constant until
1986, reflecting the relative decline in immigration in the 1970s, and then grew
slightly again. Nearly 5 million people migrated to Australia and settled
permanently between 1945 and 1989 (BIR, 1990b: 32). Immigrants have come from an
ever-wider range of countries. Although the British Isles played a major part
throughout the postwar period, immigration from Europe declined dramatically
from the 1960s, while immigration from New Zealand, Asia and Latin America
increased. By 1990, immigration from Britain was only 18 per cent of total entries,
compared with 54 per cent in 1966. Eight of the top ten countries of origin were
Asian, and Hong Kong looked set to displace the UK from its top position. As a
result, the ethnic composition of the population has shifted considerably. In 1947,
nearly 90 per cent of the population were Australian-born, and most of the rest were
from the UK. In 1986, 79 per cent of the population were Australian-born and 21 per
cent were overseas born. Twenty per cent of the Australian born were children of
immigrants. In other words, over two fifths of the Australian population were
immigrants or children of immigrants.
TABLE 3: AUSTRALIAN POPULATION 1947-1990
Census Year

Overseas -Bom

Total Population

1947
1954
1961
1971
1976
1981
1986
1990

744,187
1,286,466
1,778,780
2,579,318
2,718,318
3,003,834
3,247,301
3,851,500

7,579,358
8,986,530
10,508,186
12,755,638
13,548,448
14,576,330
15,602,163
17,335,900

Overseas-Born
Per cent of Total
9.8
14.3
16.9
20.2
20.1
20.6
20.8
22.2

Sources: DILGEA, 1988: Table A3; Census, 1986; BIR, 1992.1990 figures are provisional.

According to the 1986 census, 7.2 per cent of the Australian population were born in
the UK and Ireland, a further 7.2 per cent in other European countries, 1 per cent in
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the Middle East, and 2.6 per cent in Asia. Two per cent of the Australian-born were
Aborigines. Figure 1 shows how the composition of the immigrant population has
changed since 1901.
FIGURE 1
Australia: Per Cent of Overseas-Born Population by Continent of Origin
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In 1986, the 262,000 Italian-born were the second largest overseas-born group in the
population, following the UK and Ireland bom.
TABLE 4: THE TEN LARGEST IMMIGRANT GROUPS IN AUSTRALIA, 1986
Country of Origin

Number

UK and Ireland
Italy
New Zealand
Yugoslavia
Greece
Germany
Netherlands
Vietnam
Poland
Lebanon

1,127,000
262,000
212,000
150,000
138,000
115,000
95,000
83,000
68,000
56,000

Per Cent of OverseasBom Population
34.7
8.1
65
4.6
4.2
35
2.9
2.6
2.1
1.7

Source: DILGEA, 1987

Because Italian migration virtually ceased 20 years ago, there are very few young
Italian-born people. Most are concentrated in the higher age groups, with 14 per
cent aged over 64 (compared with 10 per cent of the total population) (ABS, 1989).
The Australian-born and educated second generation of Italo-Australians started
entering the labour market in the 1970s and 1980s. Second-generation Italo-
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Australians are still overwhelmingly concentrated in the younger age groups: in
1986,37 per cent were aged under 15,35 per cent from 15 to 24,19 per cent from 25 to
34, and only 9 per cent over 35 (DILGEA, 1988b: 84).

Immigrants can become citizens after two years of residence in Australia. The 1986
census showed that 59 per cent of overseas-born persons had become Australian
citizens. There are substantial variations for different countries of origin. Only 47
per cent of persons from the UK and Ireland and 24 per cent of persons from New
Zealand had taken up citizenship. This compared with 76 per cent of Italian-born
persons, 91 per cent of the Greek-born, 95 per cent of those born in the USSR and 63
per cent of persons born in Asia. Anyone born in Australia to parents who are either
citizens or permanent residents, is automatically a citizen. Australian-born
children of Italians are therefore Australians, even though they may still speak
Italian and identify with their Italian heritage. In 1986, there were 300,997
persons who had been born in Australia with at least one Italian-born parent
(DILGEA, 1988a: 82). Thus the Italo-Australian first and second generation1
together made up 563,000 people, or 3.6 per cent, of the total population of
Australia.

Italians have tended to seek spouses within their own ethnic groups. However
intermarriage is on the increase: in 1961 only 21 per cent of Italian-born men who got
married in Australia had Australian-born brides; by 1976 the figure had risen to 51
per cent and by 1986 to 64 per cent. As for Italian-born brides, in 1961 only 3 per cent
married Australian-born men; a figure which rose to 23 per cent in 1976 and 49 per
cent in 1986 (ABS, 1989: 59). These figures show that women are less likely to marry
outside the Italian community than men, but that the propensity is increasing for
both sexes. However, a proportion of the Australian-born brides and bridegrooms
are undoubtedly second (or third) generation Italo-Australians, so that precise data
on intermarriage with other ethnic groups cannot be given.

The family and home ownership are high priorities for Italian immigrants. Over
90 per cent of their households in 1986 were family units without non-family
members living in them. The figure was similar to that for other southern

1

Usage of
sense, to
consider
example,
terms.

the term second generation varies. Here we use the term in a strict statistical
refer to children born in Australia with overseas-born parents. Some people
that children who were born overseas, but migrated at an early age (for
less than ten) also belong to the second generation, at least in psychological
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Europeans (Greeks, Maltese, Yugoslavs), but much higher than for eastern or
western Europeans (70-80 per cent), Asians (77 per cent) or the Australian-born (74
per cent). Altogether there were 161,600 households with Italian-born heads, with
an average size of 3.6 persons (ABS, 1989: 64).
No less than 70 per cent of Italian households owned their own dwellings outright
in 1986, while a further 19 per cent were still paying off housing loans. This is the
highest rate of home ownership of any ethnic group in Australia. Italian migrants
have always been eager to own houses, and have been willing to make great
sacrifices to do so. It is generally believed that this is connected with their peasant
origins: lack of land ownership put Southerners at the mercy of the baroni, so that
owning land and house was always a priority. Owning a house also provides
security for old age.
The 1986 census indicated that over 2 million people spoke languages other than
English at home, the most common being Italian (416,000 people), Greek (267,000)
and Chinese (131,000). One way of getting an idea of the size of the Italian
community is to compare the number of Italian-born persons with the total number
who speak Italian at home. The Italian-language speakers includes the majority of
the first generation, plus those members of the second and third generations who
regularly use the Italian language, and is a very rough indicator of maintenance of
Italian culture. Table 5 shows the distribution of Italian speakers by state. Most
Italo-Australians are bilingual, speaking Italian at home, and English at work or
school. Often the language spoken at home is a distinct dialect such as Calabrese,
Sicilian or Friulian (Rando and Leoni, 1992).
TABLE 5: ITALIAN-BORN PEOPLE AND ITALIAN SPEAKERS, 1986
State

Italian-Born

Italian-Speakers

Italian-Speakers
by State (Per cent)

Victoria
New South Wales
Queensland
South Australia
Western Australia
Tasmania
Northern Territory
Australian Capital
Territory
TOTAL AUSTRALIA

109,204
73,174
17,418
29,607
27,751
1,259
1301
2,721

178,097
113,203
26,115
48,179
43,590
1,590
1,040
3,951

42.8
27.2
6.3
11.6
105
0.4
0.3
0.9

262,435

415,765

100.0

Source: Jupp, 1988: 969-71
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Some Italian farming communities still exist, but the major focus of Italian
communities are the big cities: in 1986 three-quarters of Italian-born people lived in
Melbourne, Sydney, Adelaide and Perth, and only 16 per cent lived outside the 12
major urban centres (Ware, 1988: 617-18). There are no exclusively or even
predominantly Italian areas, but local concentrations are large enough to give
certain neighbourhoods a typically Italian character. Victoria has the greatest
absolute number of Italians, with over 100,000 in Melbourne alone. All the main
Italian areas are parts of Melbourne, either in the centre, or the north. The earliest
concentration was in the central area of Carlton, which is today an up-market
neighbourhood, near Melbourne University, with high-class Italian restaurants,
cafes and shops. Migrants moved out of this original 'little Italy7, buying houses in
the surrounding suburbs. Others live in Broadmeadows around the huge Ford motor
works, where many Italians work.

The main Italian areas of Sydney are in the industrial inner-west and outer-west.
One of the earliest areas of settlement, Leichhardt, has maintained its Italian
flavour, although many Italians have moved out to surrounding areas, or to the
sprawling western suburbs. Fairfield has the largest Italian-born population in
absolute numbers. Outside Sydney, there are two major concentrations: the steel city
of Wollongong, which has also had an Italian fishing community for many years,
and the agricultural area of Griffith, which actually has the largest Italian
percentage of population of any area in NSW. Adelaide has Italian
neighbourhoods in several central districts, with Italian-born people making up
over one fifth of the population in some cases. There are relatively few Italians in
non-metropolitan areas of South Australia. Western Australia has concentrations
of Italians in its capital city, Perth, particularly in the centre and north of the city.
However there is also a large and long-established community in the harbour and
fishing town of Fremantle. In Queensland, Italians are concentrated in Brisbane,
though many remain in the sugar-cane areas of the north.

Work and Social Mobility
Many pre-1945 Italian settlers had become independent farmers or small businessowners, but most of the post-1945 migrants started work on building sites or in
factories. For example, 68 per cent of Italian workers in Melbourne in 1971 were
manual production workers (Lever-Tracy and Quinlan, 1988: 55-6). Italian and
other southern European migrants were often scathingly referred to as 'factory
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fodder'. Most were of peasant background, with little education or industrial
experience. The 1986 census showed that 6 per cent of Italian-born people in
Australia in 1986 had not been to school at all, while 30 per cent had left school at
the age of 12 or younger. Only 1.4 per cent had tertiary qualifications (BIR, 1990b:
12-15). Even those with skills were often steered into unskilled work. The question
is whether Italian settlers have been able to achieve upward social mobility in the
long run.

Figures 2 and 3 examine the employment status of Italian men and women from 1947
to 1986. The charts show that high proportions of both Italian men and women were
employers or self-employed in 1947. By 1966, however, about 80 per cent of both men
and women had become employees. Only 8 per cent of Italian men were employers
and 11 per cent were self employed. For women the rates in 1966 were 4 per cent
employers and 6 per cent self employed. However, the trend was reversed in the
1970s, as Italian-born people left the factories and set up businesses. By 1986, only
67 per cent of Italian men were employees, while 10 per cent were employers and 17
per cent were self employed. For women, the figures were 72 per cent employees, 7
per cent employers and 13 per cent self employed.

FIG U R E 2
Italian-born Men by Labour Force Status, Per Cent
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FIGURE 3
Italian-Born Women by Labour Force Status, Per Cent
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In 1966, the overwhelming majority of Italian born men (68 per cent) were labourers
and related workers, while only 4 per cent were managers and administrators and 1
per cent were professionals. The proportion of women who were labourers and
related workers was 54 per cent, while 1 per cent were managers and administrators
and a further 1 per cent were professionals. Figures 4 and 5 show the occupational
patterns for Italian-born men and women in 1986, in comparison with the total
workforce of Australia.

Figure 4 shows that Italian-born men still have an occupational distribution which
differs markedly from the overall Australian pattern: they are over represented in
the manual categories of trades, plant operators and labourers, and under
represented in the white collar categories of managers, professionals, paraprofessionals, clerks and sales and services. The manager category needs some
interpretation, since it is generally seen as a high status area. In fact it includes
small shopkeepers and farmers, so that the fairly high representation of Italians
does not necessarily indicate upward mobility. For women, Figure 5 shows a
somewhat similar picture. However the over representation in the manual
categories of plant operators and labourers is even more marked, and the under
representation as clerks is also dramatic.
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FIGURE 4
Italian Men Compared with All Men in Workforce by Occupation, 1986
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FIGURE 5
Italian Women Compared with All Women in the Workforce by Occupation, 1986
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It is also useful to look at the distribution by industry. In 1966, 39 per cent of Italian
men were employed in manufacturing and 23 per cent in construction. By 1986, the
proportion in manufacturing had fallen to 24 per cent and that in construction to 18
per cent. The decline in these sectors was matched by a shift into the service sectors.
As for women, the peak figure for manufacturing was 62 per cent in 1954, declining to
26 per cent in 1986 (few women are employed in construction). Again, there was a
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marked shift into the services. A comparison with the rest of the population in 1986
shows a slight over representation of the Italian born in agriculture, forestry,
fishing and hunting, and a marked over representation in manufacturing and
construction. The Italian born were under represented in finance, property and
business, public administration and defence and community services (BIR, 1990a).

The conclusion which emerges is that Italian immigrants have been able to move
out of manual jobs in manufacturing and construction to some extent in the last 25
years. This shift is due partly to the decline in such jobs as a result of restructuring,
partly to the ageing of the migrant generation, many of whom have left the
workforce, and partly to upward mobility. However, compared with the AngloAustralian workforce, both Italian men and women still remain substantially over
represented in such jobs, and under represented in higher status white collar jobs.
But this finding must be modified by two factors. The first is the situation of
Italians in business. The other is the position of the second generation.

Many Italians used small business as a route out of factory work, when other
opportunities were blocked by poor English or lack of recognized qualifications. By
1981,24 per cent of Italian-born men and 17 per cent of women were self-employed or
employers, compared with 16 per cent of Australian-born men and 12 per cent of
women. Italians were highly represented in food and beverage manufacturing,
clothing and footwear manufacturing, construction, retail trade and personal
services. Distinct niches emerged: one third of all fruit and vegetable stores in
Australia were run by Italians in 1981, and they played a major part in clothing
stores, shoe repairers, bread and cake shops, fish shops, take-away food stores, and
some building trades such as concreting. Although small business was the rule, some
Italians were able to establish large-scale enterprises, especially in the food
manufacturing and construction sectors. Business success was generally based on very
long hours of work, frugality and family cooperation. Italian-owned businesses
played a major part in community development, providing visible focal points for
ethnic neighbourhoods, and symbolizing the Italian presence for Anglo-Australians
(Collins, 1992).

As for the second generation, census figures show that children of Italian-born
people had much higher levels of educational attainment than their parents.
There are clear signs of upward mobility. Many children of manual workers have
moved into white-collar employment, with some reaching managerial, executive or
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professional status. However, it appears that average occupational status levels
for the second generation are still below those of Anglo-Australians (Vasta, 1992).

The Italo-Australian Community
Forty years after the inception of the main wave of Italian migration and twenty
years after its completion, is it possible to speak of an Italo-Australian community?
Certainly there are many sources of division. Patterns of settlement often reflected
regional differences in Italy. There are also divisions of class between the
predominantly working-class groups in the main areas of settlement, the successful
entrepreneurs who have moved up and out, and the middle-class immigrants who
always had a distinct role. Gender divisions are significant too: migration to
Australia has led to a questioning of patriarchal family structures by many women,
who sometimes prefer Australian norms on relations between men and women. All
these divisions re-crystallise around the generation gap. The second generation are
better educated than their parents and often have better jobs. Many have social
relations with people of non-Italian background, and intermarriage is common. The
second generation often move out of the 'Little Italies'.

Yet it would be wrong to dismiss the idea of an Italo-Australian community, for
there are tangible signs of its presence. The most obvious lies in the creation of
Italian space in Australian cities. There are neighbourhoods where the two key
markets (labour and housing) have been gradually taken over by Italians. Home
ownership and small business lead to a concentration of the ethnic group, and also
form the basis for economic security and social networks. Shops, cafes and
restaurants give streets a visible Italian character, as well as providing points of
communication. Soon agencies relating to migrants' needs (travel agents, tax
advisers, etc) are set along with 'ethnic professionals' such as doctors, lawyers and
accountants.

The communita gives rise to other processes, designated by Pascoe (1992: 94-5) as
'naming, ritualization and institutionalization'. The first refers to Italianization
of the names of streets or areas, sometimes through corruption of English words—a
process linked to the evolution of a specific Italo-Australian linguistic code (Rando
and Leoni, 1992). Ritualization refers to religious and regional festivals, which are
transplanted to the new environment and take on new characteristics and
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significance. Institutionalization refers to the establishment of mutual aid
societies, cultural associations, social clubs and the like.

The institutional structures of the Italo-Australian community are many-faceted.
The Catholic Church has played a central role. It was an Irish church before largescale Italian settlement, and was not always welcoming towards the newcomers.
Italians often found the rituals unfamiliar, and missed the social role of the church
to which they were accustomed. Italian priests, particularly of the Capuchin and
Scalabrinian orders, came with the migrants. They introduced services in Italian
and gained (often with difficulty) the consent of the Australian bishops to
celebration of saints days which were significant for the migrants (such as the
Sicilian Festa dei tre santi). Italian priests and services in the Italian language
became common.

Social clubs have played an extremely important role in maintaining social links
within the Italian community. Clubs like the Marconi in Western Sydney and the
Fraternity in Wollongong have grown from small beginnings to enormous buildings
catering for family entertainment, meals, sports, gambling, weddings, political
meetings, etc. Their central role in the Italo-Australian community is documented
by the fact that politicians—including the Prime Minister and the Leader of the
Opposition—visit them to canvass for votes. The clubs link the generations,
providing a meeting place for the aged as well as a safe venue for teenage dances
(Alcorso et a t,

1992: 106-13). Today these clubs also have many non-Italian

members.

Italo-Australian associations are too numerous to deal with in detail here. In the
early stages of settlement, mutual aid associations based on villages or regions of
origin were common. They often developed into more broadly-based social, cultural,
welfare and educational organisations. Many were concerned with maintenance of
language and culture, setting up weekend schools for migrants' children. There are
two competing welfare organisations at the national level: COASIT, which is close
to the Church and fairly conservative, and FILEF which has a left-wing
orientation. The rivalry between the two has often been bitter, and has centred not
only around the question of who can best represent the Italian community, but also
around obtaining funding from the Australian Government. At present both
associations are developing programs relating to the needs of the second generation,
such as youth work and drug counselling (Alcorso et al.f 1992:113-6).
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Another facet of the Italian community is its mass media. La Fiamma appears
twice a week with a print-run of 28,000. It reports on Italian and Australian affairs
in Italian, but also has a two-page English language section, in recognition of the
poor Italian of some of the second generation. II Globo appears weekly with a printrun of 35,000. It is similar in character to la Fiamma but lacks an English section.
Both papers are thought to be close to the Democraziana Cristiana. There are a
number of monthlies, including the FILEF's Nuovo Paese. Italian is also widely
used in radio broadcasting, both on the government multicultural stations 2EA and
3EA and on a number of private transmitters. Italian films and a weekly newsbulletin are transmitted on the government multicultural television station, SBS
(Alcorso et al., 1992: 116-21).

Taking all these practices and institutions together, it seems undeniable that there
is an Italo-Australian community, and that it is linked to specific forms of ItaloAustralian culture and identity. None of these can be seen as monolithic, but at
times they can transcend the divisions of regional origin, class, gender and
generation mentioned above. Perhaps it is more realistic to speak of a set of
interlocking networks which coalesce or divide in different ways according to the
issue. The Italo-Australian community originated partly out of the need for
solidarity in the face of discrimination and racism in the early period of
settlement. Today there may be unity on some issues and deep conflicts on others
(Vasta, 1992).

The growth of the communita has influenced the wider society too. The Italian
neighbourhoods were at first seen by Anglo-Australians as threatening 'ethnic
ghettoes'. Today the ambiente has come to be seen as exciting and attractive. The
original Italian centres of Carlton in Melbourne and Leichhardt in Sydney have
become highly fashionable, with expensive restaurants and gourmet shops.
Similarly, the festa has become gentrified. For instance the main Melbourne arts
events was until recently known as the Spoleto Festival. Italian culture and life
style is seen as an enrichment of Australian society.

Italian Settlement and Australian Multiculturalism
Together with over one hundred other immigrant groups of varied ethnic and
cultural background, Italo-Australians have helped to change Australia's culture
and national identity. This was never envisaged by the architects of the postwar
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immigration program. Policies were designed to bring about social and cultural
assimilation, so that immigrants would become indistinguishable from AngloAustralians. Politicians and social scientists believed that any special measures for
migrants would hinder assimilation. It was best to totally immerse the newcomers
in Australian society. There was public discrimination against people speaking
other languages, who were told to 'shut up or speak English'. Migrants were to
work, live and go to school among Australians.

By the 1960s, the basic contradiction of assimilationism was becoming obvious:
Isfew Australians' were meant to speak English, behave like Australians, and to be
absorbed into the population. At the same time they were needed as manual
workers in factories and construction, to replace Anglo-Australians who were
moving into white-collar jobs. Institutional barriers often kept immigrants in lowpaid jobs, while welfare services were sometimes inaccessible to immigrants, and
did not meet their special needs. Not only closeness to the factory, but also
experience of racism in Anglo-Australian neighbourhoods caused immigrants to
cluster together. In the inner-city areas, immigrants could create their own
communities. The reconstitution of the ethnic group in the new country provided
support networks and a sense of belonging.

Assimilationism was based on the idea that only Anglo-Australian culture was
legitimate, and that other cultures would have to disappear. It fitted in with
other racist elements in Australian identity, in particular the oppression of
Aboriginal people, and the exclusions of Asians through the White Australia
Policy. But by the 1960s, world-wide decolonisation and anti-racist movements
were leading to a questioning of Australian racism. In 1967 a referendum decided
overwhelmingly that Aborigines should be granted full citizenship. Australia's
international relations were changing too: by 1966, Japan was Australia's biggest
export customer, and trade with south-east Asia was growing rapidly. The White
Australia Policy was a serious embarrassment, and was abandoned in the mid 1960s.

The reforms introduced by the 1972-75 Australian Labor Party (ALP) Government
included non-discriminatory immigration rules and the first enunciation of the
doctrine of multiculturalism. However, the government was not primarily concerned
with cultural pluralism but rather with the improvement of welfare and
educational systems, and their adaptation to a multi-ethnic society. Nonetheless,
the involvement of spokespersons and organisations of migrant groups did encourage
the formal constitution of ethnic community organisations, and the growth of an
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ethnic rights movement. The 1975-82 Liberal-Country Party Government retained
multiculturalism, but redefined it in cultural pluralist terms. Multiculturalism was
now said to mean that Australian institutions should adapt to the diverse
composition of the population, while ethnic groups should be allowed to retain
their languages, traditions and cultural identity, as long as they were loyal to the
'overarching values' of Australian society. Migrant organisation were given a
subsidized role in welfare service delivery. Special institutions and services
included the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs, the Multicultural
Education Program, the Adult Migrant Education Service and the Special
Broadcasting Service (SBS) (Castles et ah, 1988: 66-67).

The ALP returned to power in 1983, and the 'Great Immigration Debate' started.
There were calls for restrictions on immigration and warnings of a threat to identity
and social cohesion through the 'Asianization of Australia'. Politicians of both
right and left began to feel that there was widespread opposition to
multiculturalism. In 1986, the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs was
abolished, funding for English as a Second Language teaching was cut, and plans
were made to merge the SBS with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC).
But the cuts led to an ethnic mobilisation which threatened the Labor hold on
marginal seats in Sydney and Melbourne. Many of the cuts were reversed in 1987.
The new direction was signalled by the establishment of an Office of Multicultural
Affairs (OMA), with powers to monitor government policy; the setting up of a
Prime Minister's Advisory Council on Multicultural Affairs (ACMA) and the
dropping of the proposed ABC-SBS merger.

Since 1988, the ALP Government has reshaped multiculturalism. It argues that an
ethnically diverse population is better placed to respond to the challenges of
increased international trade and communication, and above all to provide the
opening to Asia which is seen as crucial to Australia's future. The most significant
statement of the new approach is contained in the National Agenda for a
M ulticultural Australia (OMA, 1989), which identifies 'three dimensions of
multicultural policy'—cultural identity, social justice and economic efficiency.
Multiculturalism is not defined in terms of cultural pluralism, but as a system of
rights of all citizens in a democratic state. These rights, however, are limited by an
overriding commitment to the nation, a duty to accept the Constitution and the rule
of law, and the acceptance of basic principles such as tolerance and equality,
English as the national language and equality of the sexes. The document recognizes
that some groups are disadvantaged by lack of language proficiency and education,
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as well as by discrimination based on factors such as race, ethnicity, gender or
culture. It is seen as the role of government to combat such discrimination through
legislation and institutional structures.

Italo-Australians have played an active role in bringing about the shift from a
monocultural identity and an assimilationist policy to a multicultural concept of
Australian society. It was a two-sided process: through their cultural and political
activities, Italians contributed to the establishment of multiculturalism, which in
turn became the context for the emerging Italo-Australian community. As the
largest non-British immigrant group, Italians appeared as the main cultural
alternative from about 1950 to 1980, offering a distinctive and attractive life-style.
They refused to be assimilated, constructing their own urban space and challenged
existing ways of doing things. They showed the benefits of diversity for culture and
society, and paved the way for the contribution of other ethnic groups (Pascoe, 1992:
97; Vasta et al., 1992).

The Italo-Australians also developed a political presence, although not with a
high profile. They have not established their own political parties or trade
unions, nor have they gained significant representation in parliaments. On the
other hand, there are a large number of local councillors and some mayors of Italian
origin. There are no machine politics or ethnic blocks, yet the 'ethnic vote' appears
to be an issue which influences the behaviour of Australian political leaders. Not
only do they approach Italian (and other ethnic) associations to mobilise electoral
support, they also make concessions to ethnic needs and interests in their policies.

The explanation for this combination of a low political profile with fairly
successful interest articulation seems to lie in the relative openness of the
Australian political system. Postwar immigrants to Australia encountered a very
different situation than the large pre-1914 influxes to North America. There, both
employers and governments followed exclusionary or divisive strategies, with new
immigrant groups being used as cheap labour and strike breakers. Where they
resisted, the full force of the state was used against them. In Australia,
governments and strong unions combined to guarantee orderly industrial relations,
which would not threaten the conditions of local workers. Policies of assimilation
may have been discriminatory because they set out to destroy migrants' cultures, but
by providing civil rights and citizenship, they did lay the ground work for
political integration. Multiculturalism has given a recognized role to ethnic
organisations in policy making. This has often led to co-option of ethnic
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leaderships, and a process of consultation rather than confrontation in the
articulation of ethnic interests (Castles et al. 1992: 125-39). However, the fact that
ethnic groups were allowed to voice their interests does not mean that they have
obtained a share in real political power. The key positions in the corporate sector,
the parties, the bureaucracy, the professions, the media and the unions are still
held by men of British or Irish origin (Jupp, 1984: 182).

Italo-Australians on the Pacific Rim
For the first 150 years of the existence of white Australia, the essential factors
which structured the world for its inhabitants were dependence on Britain, and a
strong eurocentrism—that is a belief in the moral, technological and cultural
superiority of white civilisations based on European ideas. The Australian world
view thus had two central elements: the first was the 'cultural cringe', the takingfor-granted of being an adjunct of a more powerful and capable society. The second
was the idea that other cultures—and particularly those of Asia—were inferior
and threatening.

Britain's defeat in the Pacific in 1941-42, and the subsequent crumbling of the
Empire, shook this world-view, but did not shatter it: Britain could for a while be
replaced by our 'great and powerful friend', the USA. The real crunch for Australia
has come since the 1970s. Today, the end of the Cold War, the economic decline of
the USA, the move towards unification of western Europe, the rise of Northeast
Asia and the growing significance of transnational capital, are all leading to re
alignment of political, economic and military structures. The most significant factor
is the economic ascendancy of Japan and other Asian capitalist countries. It is
increasingly obvious that Australia needs to change its orientation away from
Europe and the USA, towards the Asian-Pacific region (Garnaut, 1989).

The Australian economy is indeed shifting its focus. By the end of the 1980s, half of
foreign trade was with Asian countries. Their hunger for raw materials and, more
recently, for foodstuffs, fitted well with Australia's desire for manufactured goods.
On the other hand investment flows between Australia and Asian-Pacific countries
are still low. In any case, economic openness to Asia is no guarantee of technological
advancement or improved export performance. Japanese and other Northeast Asian
countries have already achieved a high level of market penetration in Australia.
This has been a major factor in the failure of Australia's attempts to achieve a
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strong manufacturing sector. At the same time, these countries maintain high tariffs
against Australian agricultural products, and use their situation as near-monopoly
buyers to control the prices of mining commodity exports. Yet Australian production
has always been highly integrated with the world economy, and any attempt at
national autarchy would be disastrous. Australia, therefore, appears to be damned
if it does open up to Asia but also damned if it doesn't.

Increasingly, it is being realised that the only resolution to this dilemma lies in
cultural change. On the one hand this means the development of a 'productive
culture' to bring Australian technology and management up to world standards. On
the other hand it means a cultural opening to allow new forms of communication and
interaction with the Asian-Pacific region. However, attitudes are still determined
by generations of cultural distance, ignorance about Asian societies and racist
contempt for Asian people. The Australian education system virtually ignored Asia
until the 1980s. Asians were regarded as mysterious and inscrutable; their
languages were incomprehensible, and their cultures impenetrable. Steps are now
being taken to remedy this through the teaching of Asian languages and the study
of Asian social, economic and political institutions.

The basic contradiction of the Australian condition is that a society established as
an outpost of Britain has been cut off from its antecedents by global change, and is
now compelled to relate to the Asian-Pacific region which surrounds it. A national
identity constituted through insularity and racism has to come to terms with the
all-too-obvious decline of white, European superiority. It might be argued that the
whole two century episode of British settlement has been an historical aberration,
an accidental conjuncture of colonialism, which will disappear without trace, as
Asia develops in the next century. However, British colonialism in the Pacific can
also be seen as one facet of the process of historical change which started with the
Italian Renaissance. The expansion of long-distance trade and colonialism brought
wealth, new commodities, and new ideas to Europe. These provided the basis for
the emergence of capitalism, industrialisation and modernity, which spread as a
new global culture throughout Europe, and then to the Americas and Asia. The
Asian form of industrialisation has a unique dynamic, but it would be unthinkable
without the preceding emergence of a world capitalist market. British culture in
Australia may have been narrow and exclusionary, but it was only one sub-set of the
broad and pervasive culture of modernity.

80 THE CHALLENGE OF MULTICULTURALISM

It is in this historical perspective that we can see the significance of Italian
influence. Mass immigration of Italians and other Europeans undermined AngloAustralian narrowness, showing not only that there were other ways of doing
things, but also that these ways were often more successful, dynamic and rewarding.
Integration and community-building did not only change the immigrants and their
cultures; they also influenced Australian institutions, life-styles and world views.
European settlement made it necessary to shift from assimilationism, based on
Anglo-Australian cultural dominance, to multiculturalism, which is premised on
acceptance of cultural diversity.

Today, Australian multiculturalism can provide a workable answer to a question
which affects many countries: how can a diverse population be incorporated within
a single nation state? This requires a new definition of national identity, which is
not based on national or ethnic origins. It is true that multiculturalism is not
universally accepted in Australia, and that racism re-surfaces regularly in public
debates on immigration and identity, and in discrimination and hostility against
minorities. But today racism evokes a response from the organised ethnic
communities, from a broad section of the public which welcomes cultural diversity,
and from political leaders who see multiculturalism as vital for Australia's
political and economic interests.

Thus, we may conclude that the Italians who migrated to the Pacific rim not only
helped to open Australia to a greater diversity of European cultures. They also
paved the way for Anglo-Australian awareness of new geo-political realities, and
in the long run for the opening to Asia. Perhaps this seeming paradox will, in the
future, be resolved by new forms of international interchange and co-operation, that
may make it possible to move towards a truly global culture. Mass migration and
the emergence of multicultural societies can help prepare the ground for this
development, and history may well judge that the Italians who migrated to
Australia played a small but significant part.
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CHAPTER 5

GLOBAL WORKFORCE, NEW
RACISM AND THE
DECLINING NATION STATE

Introduction
In the closing decade of the 20th century, the world is marked by increasing
ecological, economic and cultural interdependence. Yet the nation state remains the
dominant political form. It maintains a near monopoly over the means of violence,
it is the central focus of most political struggles, and its ideological force is
demonstrated by the resurgence of nationalism in many areas. The breakup of the
Soviet Empire has opened the door to a wave of nationalisms based on ethnicity.
Reunification of Germany and the influx of ethnic Germans appears to confirm the
idea of a resurgence of nationalism based on the myth of common blood.

Despite these trends, I will argue in this paper that some of the main factors which
led to the ascent of the nation state in the last two centuries are now diminishing in
significance. The nation station is beginning to lose its position as the main focus of
power and political identity. It is not likely to disappear altogether, but rather to
lose many of its functions, and to become one focus among others of identity and
political power. The countervailing tendency in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union is the result of uneven development due to a political system which cut the
region off from the mainstream of economic and political development for half a
century. It should not blind us to the main tendency in the capitalist world.

The nation state is a form of political organisation which arose from the economic
and cultural requirements of the period of industrialisation which started in the
18th century. The nation state provided internal cultural, political and economic
integration, thus creating the conditions for defending and expanding external
boundaries. It played a crucial role in the development of the world market and the
dissemination of the global culture of technology and modernisation. Today, the
interlocking hierarchies of inequality—mainly along the dimensions of gender,
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class and ethnicity—are still constituted in specific forms within nation states
(although as general phenomena, of course, they transcend the nation state).

But the very historical success of the nation state has eroded the conditions for its
continued dominance, and made it a barrier to continued development. The political
economy of the modern world market relies on increasing international circulation
not only of capital, resources and commodities, but also of labour (i.e. people). This
is linked both to cultural homogenisation (in the sense of the pervasiveness of the
norms of rationality and efficiency) and cultural diversification (in the sense of the
intermingling of peoples from different backgrounds). In other words, the growing
economic integration of the world, and the increasing intermingling of national
cultures encouraged by migration, travel and mass communication, make it hard to
see why political legitimacy should be exclusively concentrated at the level of the
nation state. Indeed the growing importance of supranational bodies (like the
European Community or the World Bank) and the increasing strength of
regionalism are seriously questioning its dominant role.

This paper is concerned with one aspect of these developments: the effects of mass
labour migration and the emergence of new ethnic minorities on national identity
and political legitimacy in advanced industrial countries. The nation state
typically constitutes its boundaries through processes of inclusion and exclusion
based on the construction of 'race' or ethnicity. According to Ernest Gellner
'...nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic
boundaries should not cut across political ones, and in particular, that ethnic
boundaries within a given state...should not separate the power-holders from the
rest' (Gellner, 1983: 1). Nationalism is based on the idea that every ethnic group
should have its own state, with flag, army, Olympic team and postage stamps.
Similarly, Benedict Anderson defines the nation as '...an imagined political
community' (Anderson, 1983: 15). The membership and territory of the sovereign
nation is limited, and is defined through the belief in 'a deep, horizontal
comradeship' (Anderson, 1983: 16). But this community is 'imagined' because
members of a nation can never personally know most of the other members. The
question is therefore: what causes individuals to feel solidarity with some people
and not others, or, in other words, how is ethnicity constituted and why is it
regarded as more meaningful than other forms of solidarity?

The growing ethnic minorities within virtually all developed countries are often
excluded from the 'imagined community' of the nation, through both informal and

86 THE CHALLENGE OF MULTICULTURALISM

institutional racism. Currently, these processes of exclusion are based on the 'new
racism': an ideology of the incompatibility of different cultures and the
inevitability of conflict between distinct ethnic groups. But if groups which belong
to the economic and social life of a country are excluded from the political sphere,
this undermines the legitimacy of the state, and questions its relationship with
civil society. Caught in the contradiction between the desire to maintain
nationalism as an instrument of political integration, and the problem of managing
community relations in increasingly diverse societies, states have developed a
variety of strategies, ranging from permanent exclusion and marginalization of
minorities (the West German model), to attempts to integrate minorities through
citizenship and multiculturalism (the Australian model). Before discussing these in
more detail, it is necessary to describe the development of a global workforce, the
formation of new ethnic minorities, and the way new racism sets out to stabilise
national identity.

Labour Migration and the Development of a Global
Workforce
Labour migration has always played a central role in capitalist development. In
the early colonial period, forced labour and slavery in Africa, Asia and the
Americas were a major source of capital accumulation for Western Europe, making
possible industrial revolutions, which in turn led to recruitment of migrant workers:
the Irish in Britain, Poles and Italians in Germany and France. In the case of the
USA, nearly 30 million immigrants, mainly from Europe, entered between 1861 and
1920, providing the labour for industrialisation. This was followed by the Great
Migration of blacks to the industrial area from the former slave states of the Deep
South. Then the Great Depression and a series of restrictive laws kept migration
from overseas low until 1965. Within Europe, there was little migration between
1918 and 1939, but the Second World War soon led to new mass population
movements, while the Nazi War machine ran on forced migrant labour.

Since 1945, there have been two main phases (although the exact forms and periods
have varied for different countries and regions): the period 1945 to about 1973 was
characterised by centralisation of productive capacities and recruitment of migrant
labour in Western Europe and North America. The subsequent period was
characterised by a trend towards the siting of mass production industry in new
areas, with concentration of high-technology industry, financial control, design and
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development capacities mainly in the highly-developed countries. Mass labour
migration has been central to the restructuring of the labour process and
reconstitution of the working class in developed countries in both phases. In the
early phase, the emphasis was on recruitment of low-skilled workers for
manufacturing and construction; in the later phase the migrant labour force has been
polarised between highly-skilled workers from less-developed countries (the
'brain drain') and unskilled workers both for manufacturing and the services. At the
same time, rural-urban migration and overseas emigration has been part of the
process of incorporation into the world market and industrialisation for newly
industrialising countries.

Labour migration is a central element of the new forms of global organisation of
finance, production, distribution and control, which have been emerging in the last
two decades. Even Japan, which has hitherto relied on internal labour sources, is
now experiencing an influx of undocumented workers from the Philippines,
Pakistan, Bangladesh and other poorer Asian countries. Migrant women are
employed as bar-girls and dancers, while men work illegally in construction. In
early 1990 the Japanese government rejected a legal 'guestworker' program (Sekine,
1990) and illegal migration looks certain to grow.

In view of growing populations in poor countries and declining birth-rates and
increasingly aged populations in rich countries, the pressure for labour migration
continues. Political conflicts are giving rise to increased refugee streams, while
international and even intercontinental transport is becoming more accessible. At
the same time, policies designed to contain migratory flows are proving difficult to
implement, particularly for democratic countries with existing immigrant
populations (SOPEMI 1990: 2). Thus there can be little doubt that the mass
population flows of the last half century will be dwarfed by those to come in the
next fifty years. It is necessary to look at different regions in more detail.

Western Europe
The major period of labour migration to most Western European countries was 1945
to 1973, followed by a phase of family reunion in the 1970s. Most migrants came
either through contract labour systems (the so-called 'guestworkers'), or were
citizens of former colonies (Castles et ah, 1984; Castles, 1986) Immigration was low
for most countries in the early 1980s, but began increasing again by the end of the
decade. The largest influx was into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) with
about 650,000 new entrants in 1988 and nearly a million in 1989, of whom about

88 THE CHALLENGE OF MULTICULTURALISM

350.000 were from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) (SOPEMI, 1990). Labour
migration from outside the European Community is increasing again at present.
Some former emigration countries are now experiencing mass immigration: Italy,
Greece and Spain all have influxes of undocumented workers from African and
Asian countries. Since the 1970s there have been streams of refugees from Latin
America, Africa and Asian countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan, and
these have accelerated in the last few years.

At present there are 15-20 million people of migrant origin in Western Europe,
making up between 5 and 15 per cent of the populations of various countries. Britain,
France and the German Federal Republic all have over 4 million people of migrant
origin, of whom 40-50 per cent are of non-European background (Castles, 1986,
SOPEMI, 1990).

The USA
The USA too has become more cosmopolitan through recent migrations. Just as
European colonialism eventually led to the immigration of colonised peoples to the
metropoles, now the peoples of the USA's neo-colonial world empire are coming to
the centre. The Immigration Act of 1965 created a system of worldwide
immigration, in which the most important criterion for admission was kinship
with US citizens or residents (Briggs, 1984). In the Reagan era the economic focus
moved from the heavy industrial and engineering industries of the North and midWest, to the new light industries of the Southern Sunbelt, and the services sectors of
the great cities, and millions of new jobs were created. The result was a dramatic
upsurge in immigration, reaching 600,000 legal entrants per year, plus about 100,000
refugees by the mid-1980s. In addition agribusiness encouraged the entry of up to
300.000 illegal workers per year from Mexico and other Latin-American countries.
Something like one million new migrants now enter the USA annually.

Forty per cent of population growth in the 1970s came through immigration. By 1980
there were 13.9 million overseas-born people in the USA—6.2 per cent of the total
population. In recent years, Latin Americans and Asians have come to dominate
migrant intakes, leading to a gradual shift in the ethnic composition of the
population. It is predicted that Hispanics and Asians will soon outnumber Blacks in
many areas of the USA. Asians are concentrated in certain areas, with Chinatowns
and Koreatowns in several major cities.
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Oil-Producing Countries
The dramatic increase in oil revenues after 1973 led oil-producing countries to
embark on ambitious programs of industrialisation. The result was massive
recruitment of migrant workers. Kuwait, for instance had 384,000 foreign workers by
1980. In the latter year they made up no less than 78 per cent of the labour force. In
1980 there were 2.7 million migrant workers in the Gulf oil states (Birks et al.,
1986). The workers came mainly from Arab countries, particularly from Palestine
and Jordan, but also from Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Philippines. Non-Arab oil
countries also looked to migrant labour: Venezuela imported large numbers of
foreign workers in the late 1970s, from both Latin American countries, and Southern
Europe (Cohen, 1987: 247). Workers streamed into Nigeria from other African
countries. In both these cases there was little state control or planning. Spontaneous
flows of undocumented workers fitted well with labour demand.

When the oil boom began to deflate in the early 1980s, some countries adopted
draconian measures: there were mass expulsions from Nigeria in 1983 and 1985, and
from Libya in 1985. But in the case of Kuwait, although the inflow declined, an
increasing proportion of immigrant workers were remaining after the completion of
their initial contracts (Birks et al. 1986). Despite the strict regulations governing
the situation of migrants in Gulf states, economic and social factors were leading to
longer periods of residence. These included continued demand for personnel to run
the new industries, employers' desire to maintain existing labour forces, and the
growing employment of domestic servants. However, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq
in August 1990 has led to a massive exodus of migrant workers, and future patterns
are hard to predict.

The Newly-Industrialising Countries (NICs)
One reason for the decline in labour migration to Western Europe was the
development of a 'new international division of labour', in which labour-intensive
production stages were relocated to Third World countries. The main attraction for
the foreign companies was the veiy low wages, long hours and lack of social costs in
these areas. The result was a new wave of migratory movements, both internal and
international, particularly of women, whom employers regard as most suitable for
the light assembly work in the new electronics or clothing factories. Employers
take advantage of patriarchal structures, which make women workers cheaper and
easier to control.
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The growth of manufacturing in NICs generally does not lead to reduced overseas
emigration. Rural-urban migration in countries of Latin America and South-East
Asia is bound up with the capitalist revolution in agriculture. The transformation
of rainforests into woodchips and of arable land into hamburger ranches liberates
more peasants than can be absorbed by the new world market factories. So for many
the exploding cities of Brazil, Mexico, Korea or India are mere staging posts on the
way to Europe, North America, Australia or the Gulf states.

The Changing Role of Migrant Labour in Developed
Countries
In the 1970s and 1980s there were major changes in the structure of the world
capitalist economy, which led to substantial restructuring of finance, industry and
distribution in the advanced industrial countries. 'Global cities' such as New York,
Los Angeles, Tokyo, London, Paris, Singapore and Sydney, become centres of
planning, management and innovation for the transnational corporations (SassenKoob, 1985). One result is a new polarisation emerging in the labour markets of
these countries. While demand for highly-trained specialists increases, there are
also growing numbers of low-skilled jobs in unregulated and non-unionised branches,
such as catering, the retail trades and light manufacturing. As traditional
manufacturing declines, the relatively favourable wages and employment
conditions achieved by generations of blue-collar trade unionists are being eroded.
Labour market entrants without the required educational credentials, particularly
migrants, refugees, members of ethnic minorities and women, find they have to take
low-skilled non-unionised jobs where they have little bargaining power or security
of employment. The 'global cities' pull in highly-qualified personnel from all over
the world, but also attract low-skilled migrants to service the needs of the
corporate elite. These developments have had profound effects on the situation of
migrant workers.

Firstly, the mass immigration of low-skilled workers has declined considerably.
Many countries have tried to stop entries, through closing down recruitment
schemes, or refusing entry and work permits to people without skills. However,
illegal migrants and refugees continue to provide a source of unskilled labour, and
this is often tacitly condoned by governments, particularly in the USA and—most
recently—in Japan. Immigration policies have favoured entry of highly-skilled,
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professional and managerial workers, often leading to a 'brain drain' from the
Third World.

Secondly, most of the pre-1974 migrant workers have been unable to achieve
occupational mobility, and remain in unskilled jobs in manufacturing, construction
and the services. Often their children share this position, as education systems
have failed to provide them with adequate schooling or vocational training. This
group has borne much of the brunt of industrial restructuring: lacking skills,
language proficiency and educational credentials they have been the first to lose
their jobs, and have high rates of unemployment.

Thirdly, the traditional sites of migrant incorporation into labour markets have
been eroded. Typically, newcomers used to get unskilled factory or construction jobs
while they found their feet in the new country, and were able to use these as a base
for finding better work and establishing social networks. Now most newcomers
(except those with highly recognised skills) often undergo long periods of
unemployment, or have to take insecure and often illegal jobs in the services sector.
This makes initial settlement very difficult, and often leads to long-term poverty
and isolation.

Fourthly, a new informal sector is developing, in which members of ethnic
minorities are both marginal entrepreneurs and workers. For example, the revival
of the garment industry in the highly developed countries, is due to the
exploitation of migrant women, whose wages have been forced almost as low as
those of their counterparts in Asia and Latin America (Waldinger 1986, Phizacklea
1987). The services of the great financial centres like New York, Los Angeles, Paris
and Frankfurt are run by Black, Hispanic, Asian, North African, Turkish and
Southern European entrepreneurs. Typical migrant workplaces are ethnic
restaurants, fast-food chains, retailing, garment outwork and sub-contracting in the
construction area (Castles et al., 1990). Migrant-run small businesses play a major
role in sectors too small, unprofitable or insecure to interest the large corporations.
Some groups have found 'ethnic niches' in specific occupations: the Chinese now
dominate the New York 'rag trade' (replacing the Jewish entrepreneurs and
workers of an earlier migrant generation), while Koreans play a big part in fruit
and vegetable distribution (Waldinger, 1986).
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Ethnic Minorities and New Racism
The previous section discussed the increasing significance of labour migration for
most developed countries since 1945, and the shifts in migratory patterns and forms
of incorporation of migrant labour in recent years. Migrations of various types look
set to continue, so that an increasingly international labour force will be a feature of
Western Europe, North America, Australia and Japan for the foreseeable future.
This obviously means increasing ethnic diversity in the populations of these
countries. It is important to understand that, although migrant labour forces are
heterogeneous with regard to areas of origin and skill levels, certain sections of the
immigrant population have taken on an ethnic minority position in each receiving
country.

Ethnic minority status is not a matter of numbers, but rather of processes of social
exclusion, which constitute distinct groups with inferior legal rights and/or socio
economic status. Not all immigrants belong to ethnic minorities. Although no
generalisation is true of all cases, it may be said that, on the whole, immigrants
with high occupational status, from relatively developed countries, and with a
similar cultural and ethnic background are not likely to be treated as ethnic
minorities. On the other hand, immigrants with low skill levels, from less
developed countries, and with distinct cultural and ethnic background are likely to
become ethnic minorities. Nor do all ethnic minorities consist of recent migrants:
aboriginal peoples in the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Scandinavia
are all victims of processes of social exclusion and marginalization. The USA has
long established black and hispanic minorities. Most European countries also have
'old' ethnic minorities, created by conflicts within the historical process of nation
building. And finally, Gypsies still have ethnic minority status throughout Europe.
However, we shall not deal with these old minorities here.

Rather, what we are concerned with here is the process of constitution of new ethnic
minorities as a result of the post-1945 migrations, the causes of the process, the
mechanisms by which this takes place, the effects on society as a whole, and the
consequences for the relationship between civil society and nation state. My
argument is that exclusionary policies and practices towards the new ethnic
minorities arise from attempts to control migrant labour and to preserve the
(assumed and desired) cultural and ideological integrity of the nation states
concerned, but that these objectives cannot be achieved in the long run, once the
internationalisation of the labour force and population has become irreversible.
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Ethnic minorities are constituted through processes whereby dominant groups
ascribe (real or imagined) characteristics to the group concerned, and use these to
justify exclusion from equal participation in the legal, political, economic, social
and cultural arrangements of society. These processes may be seen as racism, both
institutional and informal. Institutional racism means the development by a
dominant group of structures (such as laws, policies or administrative practices)
which exclude or discriminate against the dominated group. Informal racism is
when members of a phenotypically or culturally demarcated group express
prejudice or carry out discriminatory practices against members of another such
group in an unorganised manner.1

Racist practices, whether institutional or informal, are based on racist beliefs
(which may be held consciously or unconsciously). 'Scientific racism' which
developed in the 19th century, put forward biological theories of inherent and
immutable differences between human groups, classified according to real or
imagined physical differences. It was argued that differences in intelligence,
character, behaviour and ability could be related to these assumed phenotypes,
and that these differences inevitably led to hierarchical relationships between
the groups concerned (Miles, 1989). Such theories were used to justify European
imperialism and the exploitation of colonised peoples, as well as 'Nordic
superiority' and anti-semitism within Europe. This type of racism may be defined
as the belief that certain groups are intrinsically superior to others, and are
therefore entitled to dominate or exclude them. This belief is far from dead,
playing a major part in the ideologies of extreme-right groups, as well as in popular
culture. Nonetheless, it has been discredited, both by revulsion against the extreme
violence of Nazi racism, and by the ending of direct colonial domination. Moreover,
most natural and social scientists reject the validity of the concept of 'race' in
classifying human groups (Montagu, 1974).

The main ideology used to justify exclusionary practices against minorities in
developed countries today is a set of beliefs which have come to be called 'new
racism' (Barker, 1981). This is a discourse on 'natural difference', generally based on
the pseudoscience of sociobiology. The theory claims not to be racist, because it is
not based on ideas of racial hierarchy, and generally does not use the term 'race',
preferring 'tribe' (Morris, 1971) or 'ethnic group' (Van den Berghe, 1981). Balibar

1

It should be noted that the self-definition of cultural and social identity by members of
an ethnic minority is also relevant in this context. This will be discussed below, in the
section on the reconsitutions of culture and identity by ethnic minorities.
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speaks of 'racisme sans race' (Balibar, 1988: 36). New racism asserts that all human
groups are in principle equal, yet their cultures are different and incompatible, and
each must therefore remain on its own territory. In most variants, these cultural
differences are seen as immutable, since they are based either on 'human nature' or
on long historical processes. Where groups share the same territory through
migration, conflict is likely, and can only be prevented by excluding the interlopers
from equal participation in society, for instance by denying citizenship. The power
of this ideology lies in the way it provides an explanation of immigration and
formation of ethnic minorities that fits in with commonsense notions of natural
difference and the threat of outsiders. It presents a pseudoscientific justification for
exclusion and discrimination, while not appearing to be racist in the traditional
sense.

Immigration, Citizenship and Nation: a Comparison of
Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany
The construction of ethnic minorities must be considered in relation to four sets of
factors:
—

economic and social factors which lead to relative segregation,
hierarchy, competition and conflict in areas of immigration;

—

legal and institutional arrangements;

—

attitudes and behaviour towards minorities;

—

the reconstitution of culture and identity by minority groups within the
process of migration and settlement.

Rather than attempting to present a general model of the interaction of these
factors, I will describe them briefly in the case of two countries with widely
differing policies towards immigrants and minorities: Australia and the FRG. They
are also countries with very different traditions of nation-state formation and
citizenship. The two countries may be seen as extreme cases; any similarities we
find between them are likely to be of relevance for other countries too.

Economic and Social Factors in the Formation of Ethnic Minorities
Both Australia and the FRG had mass, organised labour migration from the
Mediterranean region in the postwar period, Australia from 1947 until the early
1970s, the FRG from 1956 to 1973. Both countries recruited low-skilled workers to
support the expansion of their manufacturing and construction sectors. Primary
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migration was followed by family settlement. In both cases, new migratory flows,
often of refugees, developed in the late 1970s, with migrants coming from a wide
range of non-European countries.

Currently Australia has an immigrant population of around 3 million—about 20 per
cent of the total population. Another 3 million are children of immigrants—the socalled second generation. However, over two fifths of immigrants are from Britain
or New Zealand, and cannot be considered to have ethnic minority status. There are
over 80 different ethnic groups, the largest being the Italians, Greeks, Germans,
Lebanese and Vietnamese. The FRG has a foreign population of 4.5 million—7.5 per
cent of the total population. One third of them are Turks; the other large groups are
mainly from Southern Europe.

Lack of education and training, together with various types of institutional and
informal discrimination restricted migrant workers' job opportunities. They became
heavily concentrated in factory work and building, though there was a subsequent
shift into the services sector. There has been relatively little upward social
mobility of the original migrant workers, so that labour forces show marked
segmentation by area of origin and gender. Certain types of work—such as car
assembly—are done predominantly by migrant men, while others—such as garment
manufacturing and food processing—are done predominantly by migrant women.
The availability of migrant labour forces has made upward mobility easier for a
section of the local labour forces.

In both countries, concentration in certain types of work was one factor leading to
concentration in certain types of housing and residential areas: generally low
quality housing in city centre or industrial areas. Other factors were institutional
and informal racism in allocation of housing, and the desire of migrants to live near
their compatriots. In both Australia and Germany there are identifiable areas of
migrant concentration. Here the infrastructure for ethnic communities can develop.
On the other hand, the indigenous population develops a perception of distinct—
and perhaps threatening—ethnic enclaves.

Thus, apart from the relative size of the ethnic minorities, there are considerable
similarities between the two countries in the economic and social situation.
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Institutional and Legal Arrangements Towards Ethnic
Minorities
However, when we look at the character of the nation-states and the way in which
immigrants have been incorporated, we find major differences. Australia is a new
nation, settled by British colonists in the 18th and 19th centuries. The relatively
small Aboriginal population was killed or pushed aside and excluded from the
emerging nation. Australia became a sovereign state in 1901, though still closely
linked to Britain. Until the Second World War most settlers were from Britain,
although there were some Irish and other Europeans. Identity was based on British
culture and traditions, and on being part of the Empire, although distinctively
Australian features began to emerge in the early part of the 20th century.

From 1901 until the 1970s, the White Australia Policy shaped entry to the nation in
explicitly racist terms. In 1947 a mass immigration policy was introduced, to
increase population for strategic reason and to provide labour for industrial growth.
The aim was to bring in predominantly British migrants, but not enough were
available. When it proved necessary to bring in Eastern and Southern Europeans,
policies were designed to bring about complete political and cultural assimilation.
State policy towards migrants was inclusionary: they were treated as 'New
Australians', and encouraged to settle as families and become Australian citizens.
Naturalisation was granted after five years (later reduced to three and then to two
years), and migrants formally had full rights in every social sphere.

Nonetheless there were (and remain today) a number of institutional barriers
which prevent migrants from fully participating in society, and lead to economic
and social disadvantage. Indeed it can be argued that labour market policies which
lead to ethnic segmentation directly contradict the ideology of assimilation.
Moreover assimilation itself is a racist policy, in that it labels immigrants' cultures
as inferior, and tries to obliterate them. As will be discussed later in this paper,
assimilationism was abandoned in the mid 1970s in favour of the a policy of
cultural pluralism called multiculturalism.

However, it is significant that Australian citizenship is inclusionary. It is based on
/us soli, that is on territoriality rather than ethnicity, and is designed to make
people from varied backgrounds part of the 'imagined community'. In other words
membership of the civil society is a membership ticket to the nation. The state,
through immigration policy, can decide who is to become part of the civil society,

THE CHALLENGE OF MULTICULTURALISM

97

and then, through the mechanism of naturalisation, make them into part of the
people.

Germany, on the other hand, is an historical nation, with roots which go back many
centuries, although attempts to define the nation in cultural terms did not become
significant until the 18th century, and the demand for a German national state did
not become significant until the 19th century (Hoffmann, 1990: 74). When the
German Reich emerged as the first real German state in 1871, it was far from
including on its territory everybody considered German. Indeed no German state has
ever done this, although the Reich put this forward as an aim, just as the later
Bundesrepublik claimed to represent all Germans, even those who had never
stepped on its soil. German nationality was defined not through territoriality, but
through ethnicity, that is through language and culture. Essentially, a person could
only obtain German nationality by being born into the German community, so that
'blood' became a label for ethnicity, and the ethnic group became the Volk.

German citizenship, then is based on ius sanguinis, and the nation-state is a
Volkstaat. Anyone who can claim German ethnicity (or 'blood') is entitled to
citizenship. When Hitler annexed Austria in 1938, he could claim that its citizens
were going 'home to the Reich', though they had never belonged to it. Similarly
Germans from the GDR, Poland, the Soviet Union, etc. can receive a passport the
moment they arrive in the FRG. But nobody who is not born German can become it.
The Nazis took away the citizenship of Jews and Gypsies whose ancestors had
lived in Germany for centuries, because they allegedly lacked German 'blood'.
Today, immigrants who have worked and lived for 20 years in the FRG are denied
naturalisation, and their children, born in the FRG, can never be German, because
they have the wrong 'blood'. Some exceptions are made: in 1987 37,810 persons were
granted German citizenship, at which rate it would take 125 years before the
whole foreign population became German (SOPEMI, 1990:187).

German citizenship is thus based on exclusion, and is fundamentally racist, defining
the 'imagined community' on the basis of culture or 'blood'. Millions of foreign
workers have been recruited for the economy. They have settled and become part of
civil society, but they are excluded from the nation, and from incorporation in the
state. This is the political rationale behind the seemingly absurd slogan 'the FRG
is not a country of immigration'. Foreigners can become members of the civil society,
but not of nation and state (see Hoffmann, 1990). It is obvious that this model cannot
be stable, as will be discussed further below.
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Attitudes and Behaviour Towards Minorities
When we turn to popular attitudes towards immigrants, we again find marked
similarities between Australia and Germany. Both countries have traditions of
racism which have their roots in 19th centuries ideas of 'Nordic' racial superiority.
Popular culture, as reflected in the mass media and in 'commonsense' knowledge, is
replete with racist stereotypes. Both countries have a history of racism towards
members of certain European ethnic groups. For instance, anti-semitism was strong in
both countries up to 1945, and has still not disappeared altogether. Past treatment
of labour migrants (such as the Irish and Southern Europeans in Australia, Poles
and Italians in Germany) was discriminatory and exploitative. Attitudes and
behaviour towards non-Europeans goes back to genocide against Aborigines and
exclusion of Chinese and other non-Europeans through the White Australia Policy
in the case of Australia. German colonialism, marked by brutal treatment of black
people in South West Africa and other territories, has left widespread prejudice
against non-Europeans.

Postwar Southern European labour migrants to both Australia and the FRG
encountered considerable hostility and discrimination. In the last 15 years or so,
both countries have had less European immigrants, and an increase in entries from
other parts of the world: the Middle East, South-East Asian and Latin America, in
the case of Australia; Turkey, North Africa and other parts of Africa and Asia in
the case of the FRG. It appears that 'otherness' is now primarily constructed around
non-European origin. In addition Islam is taken as a special marker of difference
(Commission of the European Communities, 1989; Goot, 1988). Racial attacks, public
statements, discrimination and the activities of extreme-right groups all
concentrate on non-European minorities. In Australia and the FRG (and indeed in
most other developed countries) the incidence and virulence of racism is on the
increase. There are powerful political forces calling for the stopping of
immigration, the reduction of minority rights and even mass deportation.

Increased racism has relatively little to do with the characteristics of the
minorities themselves. Rather it is linked to the economic and social crisis arising
through economic restructuring and rapid social change. In particular the working
classes of countries like Australia and Germany have suffered severe and sudden
changes in their conditions of work and life in the last two decades: new
technology, deskilling, decline in blue-collar employment, urban crisis and declines
in the welfare services. These changes have occurred at a time when immigrants,
particularly of non-European origin, have become increasingly visible in the cities.
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They appear as competitors for jobs, housing and social amenities, and as a threat
to security and life-styles.

Neo-conservative theories of difference and conflict provide an ideological
justification for such 'commonsense' interpretations of ethnic competition and
conflict. These in turn provide the basis for state strategies of crisis management
based on exclusion and control of minorities. In this area the difference between the
FRG and Australia is that the discourse of exclusion has prevailed in the former,
while in the latter it has not. The reasons for this lie partly in the different ways
in which the nation-state is constituted in the two countries, as discussed above,
and partly in the problems of managing community relations in a country with very
large minorities, as will be argued below.

The Reconstitution of Culture and Identity by Ethnic Minorities
In the process of migration and settlement, migrant groups create their own social
networks. These provide support and social contact in a strange and sometimes
hostile environment. They are often based on chain migration and some degree of
residential proximity. Typically, these networks provide a form of community
(within the wider society), marked by language and cultural maintenance,
development of educational, cultural and political organisations, and emergence of
an ethnic petit-bourgeoisie. Ethnic communities find a source of identity in
homeland culture, though this is applied in uneven and contradictory ways, and
often considerably modified in the new situation. This process is very complex, and
varies considerably in character in different immigration countries and for different
groups. A detailed discussion is not possible here.

The existence of ethnic communities is in part a reaction to informal racism: where
settlers encounter discrimination and exclusion, they group together for physical
and psychological protection. This in turn may appear to local people as a
threatening enclave or ghetto, thus confirming racist fears of 'swamping'. Equally,
institutional racism and labour market segmentation cause residential clustering, by
forcing minorities into a common low status position. Nonetheless, maintenance and
adaptation of migrant cultures and the development of communities in the cities is
a major force of social change and renewal. In both Australia and the FRG this type
of community formation has taken place, and in both cases has led to a discourse on
enclaves and Uberfremdung. The difference is that Australian policies of granting
full rights and citizenship to immigrants grants greater legitimacy to the cultural
and political expression of minorities. Often this is articulated through the
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development of minority petit-bourgeoisie's, which act both as forces of social
control and as sources of economic and cultural innovation. In the FRG, in contrast,
exclusionary policies deny legitimacy to such developments.

The point to be emphasised is that ethnicity does not arise because of ''primordial
sentiments' or the desire to maintain a separate identity within the country of
immigration. Since most migration is part of a transition from rural to industrial, it
must be assumed that most migrants are open to cultural and social change. Rather
ethnicity is part of a process of dynamic interaction, in which migrant groups use
the cultural resources available to them to cope with a particular situation within
the migratory process. Exclusionary policies by the receiving society will encourage
a trend towards traditionalism and separatism (and even fundamentalism). Denial
of cultural pluralism by racist structures and practices thus actually creates
pluralist demands from the minorities. In contrast, where receiving societies create
structures which permit equality of opportunity and civil rights to settlers,
separatism is unlikely, and migrant cultures will survive in a form of creative
interaction with the majority culture.

Whether the majority accepts the cultural rights of minority groups or not, their
survival affects the character of the nation state. Members of migrant minorities
inevitably have multiple identities, based—in varying contexts—on aspects of
homeland cultures and receiving country cultures, and on a synthesis of both. If the
minorities are excluded from the nation (as in the FRG), that very exclusion
questions the legitimacy of the state, while the denial of rights leads to conflicts
within civil society. An exclusionary nation-state must, in the long run be a
repressive and racist one. If, on the other hand, cultural pluralism is accepted, then
the whole society has to recognise a multiplicity of identities. This may undermine
a national identity based on ethnicity, and cause a redefinition of the boundaries of
the nation.
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Multiculturalism and the Nation
The comparison of immigration and minority formation in Australia and the FRG
has shown both similarities and differences. The similarities include:
—

Large-scale immigration and settlement since 1945, with increasing
numbers of non-European migrants in recent years;
Institutional and informal practices which concentrate certain groups of
migrants in manual employment, leading to marked segmentation of the
labour market according to ethnicity and gender;

—

Residential concentration in urban areas, affected by housing problems
and poor infrastructure, where competition and conflict with local
people, especially members of the working class, develop;

—

The growing significance of racist discourses, based mainly on 'new
racism', which use the presence of minorities as an explanation of
economic and social problems, and advocate exclusion and discrimination.

The differences include:
—

Larger relative size of the immigrant population in Australia;

—

An inclusionary concept of the nation in Australia, where access to the
civil society leads to inclusion in nation and state, compared with an
exclusionary, racist form of the nation in the FRG;

—

An immigration policy based on permanent settlement and citizenship in
Australia, compared with a policy based on temporary residence in the
FRG.

With regard to the similarities, both countries are fairly typical of the situation in
most developed countries. With regard to the differences, they represent opposite
poles on a continuum, where most other countries are somewhere in-between. In view
of the likely continuation (and even expansion) of migration to developed countries,
it is my hypothesis that the German model of temporary migration and exclusion
from the nation cannot be maintained in the long run, because it negates a central
principle upon which the legitimacy of the contemporary liberal state is based:
that it should appear to incorporate all significant sections of civil society, and
take account of their interests. By excluding a large and growing section of civil
society, the German model creates the conditions for separatism and conflict. The
only way of managing the real ethnic diversity of society while maintaining an
exclusionary form of nation and citizenship is by raising the new racist discourse on
difference to an official ideology. Certainly, there are strong forces, especially
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within the CDU-CSU, which are trying to do just that, as the new Auslandergesetz
shows. However they can only postpone the inevitable shift to a more inclusionary
model, and in doing so cause a great deal of conflict and hardship. They cannot
prevent the shift in the long run. The needs of administration and community
relations have already led to the emergence of multicultural policies in some areas
in education, welfare and local government. Such policies are eventually likely to
extend to areas of central government such as immigration policy, labour market
rights, welfare entitlement and citizenship.

It is therefore important to look in more detail at the development of policies for
managing diversity within Australia, and to realise that multiculturalism is not
without its contradictions and problems (the following account is based on Castles
et al. 1988). As already mentioned, assimilation was seen as the basic principle for
dealing with immigrants in the early postwar period. Access to citizenship,
together with assimilationist educational and social policies were designed to
make them 'New Australians'—indistinguishable from Anglo-Australians by the
second generation. Assimilation was thus an attempt to preserve Anglo-Australian
ethnicity as a principle for defining the nation, through cultural absorption. It
failed because labour market segmentation, residential concentration and the
maintenance of migrant cultures combined to produce continued ethnic pluralism. By
the late 1960s the explicitly racist construction of identity through assimilationism
and the White Australia Policy had to be abandoned.

The Australian Labor Party Government (ALP) from 1972-75 emphasised migrant
rights and cultural diversity as a principle for making the welfare system more
open to disadvantaged groups. However it was the Liberal-Country Party
Government of the late 1970s that really made multiculturalism a principle of
social policy. This was done within the framework of a neo-conservative agenda
devoted to cutting government expenditure, and privatising welfare. Ethnicity,
defined in primordialist terms, was made the principle for welfare delivery and
social control. By recognising the ethnic group, as represented by traditionalist,
male, petit-bourgeois leaders, the conservative government could avoid confronting
issues of class, gender and racism. Multiculturalism in this period was thus an
ideology of cultural pluralism, with no consequences for the central economic and
political structures of society.

In the period of ALP Government since 1983, multiculturalism has been redefined in
a process of public debate and conflict, in which the main contenders have been:
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—

Federal and state bureaucracies concerned both with economic efficiency
and social control;

—

Ethnic minorities, with a variety of conflicting interests and needs;

—

A labour movement concerned with potential threats to conditions both
through immigration and a divided labour force;

—

Progressive intellectuals who advocate a cosmopolitan and open concept
of the nation;

—

New racist intellectuals, who have tried to mobilise public opinion
around an exclusionary concept of national identity.

The concept of multiculturalism which has become predominant in policy-making
since about 1987 is one which accepts cultural pluralism as a long-term feature of
society, but no longer sees this as a central policy-focus. Rather the central issue is
seen as one of full equality of rights and opportunities for all citizens, whatever
their ethnic background. The National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia, an
official policy document launched by the Prime Minister in July 1989, names three
dimensions of multicultural policy (OMA, 1989):
—

Cultural identity: the right of all Australians, within carefully defined
limits, to express and share their individual cultural heritage, including
their language and religion;

—

Social justice: the right of all Australians to equality of treatment and
opportunity, and the removal of barriers of race, ethnicity, culture,
religion, language, gender or place of birth;

—

Economic efficiency: the need to maintain, develop and utilise
effectively the skills and talents of all Australians, regardless of
background.

This program is notable for its inclusionary rhetoric: it speaks not of minorities but
of 'all Australians'. It reiterates the rights of all citizens in a liberal society, and
then goes on to recognise the existence of structural barriers which have to be
removed to achieve these. The third dimension is a justification of the first two in
terms of an ideology of modernisation. It is a statement of faith in the integrative
power of the capitalist economy and the liberal state. But the program is based on
recognition that lack of language proficiency and education, together with stillexisting mechanisms of marginalization require special measures to improve the
situation of minorities. The measures announced in the National Agenda are
predominantly concerned with increasing equality of educational and occupational
opportunities, rather than with cultural pluralism. They fit in with a whole gamut
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of special institutions and services introduced in the last few years to increase
equality of opportunity and make government services accessible to people of all
ethnic backgrounds. Laws on equal opportunity in employment, and against racial
vilification and incitement are also part of the process of removing barriers.

Nobody would claim that racism has been overcome in Australia, nor that
inequalities of ethnicity and gender have been removed. It is also significant that
the issue of class is not mentioned at all in the N ational Agenda, although
inequality of income distribution, and the number of very poor and very rich
Australians are currently

increasing.

However, it is im portant

that

multiculturalism has now been defined as a necessary aspect of the constitution of
the liberal state, and that it is conceptualised in terms of economic, social and
political rights. It seems to be that this principle is significant for all states which
have experienced mass immigration, and that the best way of countering racism is
firstly to fight for the introduction of this principle, and secondly to work to give it
real social content—something which is still necessary in Australia too.

Conclusion
Migrants inevitably have multiple identities. These last for generations and lead
to links with countries of origin as well as country of residence. But then, most
people have multiple identities which relate to family, peer groups, hometown,
voluntary groups and so on—for migrants the issue of plural national identity is
added. However, this leads to a dilemma, which is already very visible in the
Australian case: if the nation can no longer be defined by ethnicity, because the
civil society is made up of many groups, nor by exclusion, because the nation-state
needs to incorporate all significant groups, what is its basis? If we add to this that
the economy is increasingly international, and that culture and language no longer
function as sufficient national markers, then the problem is obvious. If being
Australian is only defined through possession of certain economic, social and
political rights, then how is it different from being a citizen of any other liberal
democratic state?

Some people have suggested that the answer is a return to territoriality, which
was the principle for defining political status prior to the bourgeois revolutions. A
person was automatically the subject of a certain monarch, through simply being on
the soil of his or her territory. A modem version would be that as soon as a migrant
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was allowed to enter a country, he or she would be a citizen with all rights and
duties. This is an attractive option in many ways, but it effectively abolishes the
nation-state based on ethnicity. It would presumably mean the end of nationalism,
because who would be willing to die for a state which was held together only by
the legal status of a citizenship which could be readily exchanged for another one?

This would not be a reason for despondence. The only tangible function left to the
nation-state in this age of population movements and internationalisation of
economy and culture is a political one: the nation-state can to a limited extent
develop national ideologies and loyalties; it can control the means of violence; it
can manage social conflicts. The state can also provide the systems of social
security, education and training needed to reproduce the working population. The
nation state thus survives because it is still the most effective agency for managing
civil society and for social control. But this function is not one that most people on
the left would want to defend.

However, the nation-state is not on the verge of extinction. I would suggest that its
political and ideological basis has become shaky in countries with large and
diverse immigrant populations like Australia, although even here there are strong
racist and nationalist sentiments. It also appears to me that similar problems for
the definition of the nation-state will develop in other countries like the FRG,
France and Britain, as it becomes obvious that ethnic diversity can only be
effectively managed by making immigrants not only members of civil society but
also full participants in the nation. I suggest that this will give further impetus to
the development of new forms of social identification and political legitimacy,
which will erode the still-dominant role of the nation-state.
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